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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2301 (2016), by which the Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 15 November 2017 and requested that I report to the Council by 1 October 2016 and every four months thereafter. The report provides an update on the situation prevailing in the Central African Republic from the date of issuance of my previous report, 1 April 2016 (S/2016/305), to 16 September 2016, and on the implementation of the mandate of MINUSCA.

II. Major developments

A. Political developments

2. During the reporting period, and following the successful conclusion of the political transition on 31 March that marked a return to constitutional order, the Central African Republic achieved a number of significant post-transition milestones, including the swift formation of a new Government, the establishment of the National Assembly and the launch of efforts towards the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups.

3. Following his inauguration on 30 March, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra appointed Simplice Mathieu Sarandji as Prime Minister on 2 April. On 11 April, a new Government comprising 23 ministries was formed, followed by the appointment of senior members of the offices of the President and the Prime Minister on 18 May and 21 June, respectively. While the Government appointments were lauded as inclusive, the appointments to the offices of the President and the Prime Minister sparked criticism over the perceived exclusion of minority groups, in particular the Muslim community, and favouritism towards appointees who had served under former President François Bozizé.

4. On 23 April, the Transitional Constitutional Court announced the final results of the second round of legislative polls, confirming the election of 128 out of a total

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of 140 National Assembly members. Of the 128 elected, 50 were independents and 78 were affiliated with political parties; a total of 11 women were elected overall. Following the invalidation by the Court of the results in 12 constituencies due to reported discrepancies, legislative by-elections were held on 15 May and 26 June to fill the remaining Assembly seats, with support from MINUSCA in coordination with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and international partners. On 20 July, the Court annulled the results in the constituency of Bimbo 1, a suburb of Bangui, owing to discrepancies in the voting. On 2 August, the Transitional Constitutional Court concluded its work by submitting its final report, in which it proposed elements for a draft law on the operationalization of the future Constitutional Court.

5. On 6 May, the National Assembly elected Karim Meckassoua as its Speaker. As a former presidential candidate and a prominent member of the Muslim community, his election to the top legislative position was welcomed as a positive step towards social cohesion. During the reporting period, the National Assembly held three sessions, in which it elected its leadership, established its eight permanent commissions and debated issues of national security. Anti-balaka leader Alfred Yékatom, who is on the sanctions list of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, was elected as a member of the National Defence and Security Commission.

6. Meanwhile, on 29 April, the National Electoral Authority submitted a request to MINUSCA for technical and logistical support to organize regional and municipal elections. In accordance with resolution 2301 (2016), preparations are ongoing to deploy an electoral needs assessment mission later in 2016.

7. The Prime Minister presented the Government programme to the National Assembly on 7 June. The programme, which was adopted unanimously, outlined the following four priorities: (a) peace, security and social cohesion; (b) economic recovery; (c) politics and good governance; and (d) social affairs and humanitarian action. Following security incidents in the third and fifth districts of Bangui in June, the National Assembly convened an extraordinary session on national security from 27 June to 1 July. On that occasion, the National Assembly issued a declaration with recommendations to the Government and to the international community, including calls for the adoption of a national programme on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration, the establishment of the Special Criminal Court and the lifting of the arms embargo.

8. In mid-April, the President initiated a first round of consultations with representatives of armed groups, during which he urged them to disarm in order to enable national recovery and reconciliation. The President's position that disarmament must precede participation in the political process generated frustration among ex-Séléka factions, namely, the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC), the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) and the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), which had demanded positions in the Government and reintegration in the national security and defence forces as preconditions to negotiations on their disarmament. On 18 May, after meeting with representatives of the armed groups, the President issued a communiqué expressing satisfaction with the results of the consultations and

committing to addressing the concerns raised by the groups, albeit following the completion of the disarmament process.

9. Armed groups broadly welcomed the establishment, on 2 July, within the office of the President, of a national coordination mechanism for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration, security sector reform and national reconciliation, headed by the Minister Counsellor, Jean Willybiro-Sako, as Special Coordinator. Subsequently, on 24 August, the President appointed members to an advisory and monitoring committee for the national disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme, including 2 members from the executive branch, 1 from the National Assembly, 2 from civil society, 3 from religious platforms, 28 from political-military groups, and 5 representatives of the international community.

10. The President met with armed groups during visits facilitated by MINUSCA to Bouar on 6 June, Kaga-Bandoro on 6 August and Bria on 5 September. Some ex-Séléka representatives in Bria conditioned their participation in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration process on the implementation of more inclusive policies towards the Muslim community. On 5 September, Mr. Willybiro-Sako met with representatives of the ex-Séléka, UPC and the Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC), along with anti-balaka, communal and civil society representatives in Bambari, where all expressed interest in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme.

11. During his first months in office, the President visited Cameroon, Chad, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and the Sudan to revitalize regional cooperation and mobilize support for his Government. The ninth meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic was held in Bangui on 25 August, under the auspices of the African Union and the Congo. Participants acknowledged the completion of the transition and the contribution of regional and international partners to the political process. They also decided to transform the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic into the International Support Group on the Central African Republic so as to continue to assist the country in its recovery.

B. Security situation

12. The security situation remained precarious, with heightened intercommunal tensions and sporadic clashes among fragmented armed groups. Violence among ex-Séléka factions and between anti-balaka and ex-Séléka was largely triggered by internal power struggles, competition over natural resources, attempts to expand areas of control, seasonal migration of pastoralists and intercommunal tensions. Throughout the country, criminality, banditry and grave human rights abuses by armed groups continued to pose a threat to civilians.

13. To enhance cooperation and information-sharing on security issues, MINUSCA started weekly briefings on security issues with the President in August. As a result of these exchanges, a joint coordination mechanism between MINUSCA, the Government and representatives of the Central African armed forces was

established to ensure better coordination and efficiency during security-related operations, build confidence and dispel misinformation on MINUSCA actions and operations. The mechanism is expected to prevent the recurrence of incidents similar to those that occurred in July and August, in which Central African security forces obstructed the Mission's freedom of movement.

14. In a separate development, the President has created a presidential security unit composed of some 175 Central African armed forces, police and gendarmes. Members of the unit have been deployed to protect the residences of high-level government officials in Bangui.

15. In Bangui, intercommunal tensions increased in June following the killing of a Muslim youth by a Christian youth that led to skirmishes between the communities of the third and fifth districts. Intercommunal tensions were further aggravated from 18 to 24 June with the arrest by internal security forces of some 26 Muslim traders travelling to Bangui and the subsequent illegal detention of six national police officers by armed elements reportedly linked to FPRC leaders Abdoulaye Hissène and Haroun Gaye in the PK-5 neighbourhood. On 20 June, at least six people were killed and one MINUSCA peacekeeper was injured during a MINUSCA operation aimed at extracting the police officers from the police station, which was surrounded by an armed self-defence group and civilians. Efforts by MINUSCA to enable mediation by local actors and to secure the area with the French Sangaris forces helped to contain the outbreak of violence, reduce tension between local self-defence groups from the PK-5 neighbourhood and the Central African armed forces, and facilitate the peaceful release of the six police officers on 24 June.

16. On 24 June, a non-uniformed MINUSCA peacekeeper was killed in the 5th district of Bangui by a member of the Central African armed forces and was transported by unknown elements to the Bangui General Hospital, where he was later identified by MINUSCA. An investigation was opened by the national authorities on the instructions of the Public Prosecutor of Bangui and with MINUSCA support. While the case file has been completed by the national police and transmitted to the Prosecutor, the alleged perpetrator of the crime has not yet been apprehended and a verdict on the case remains pending. MINUSCA actively engaged the authorities on this issue and urged them to conclude the process.

17. During the reporting period, ex-Séléka leaders, including FPRC leader Nourredine Adam, continued to deploy efforts to reunite the various ex-Séléka factions under a single command. Attempts to organize an assembly of ex-Séléka in Bria did not materialize as planned, in part owing to the refusal of the UPC and MPC factions to participate and to the presence and posture of MINUSCA in Bria. However, some ex-Séléka members still moved towards the area. Following months of speculation over a possible meeting of various ex-Séléka factions, a general assembly of civil society groups in the north-east is now scheduled to be held in Bria in early October.

18. On 12 August, a convoy of six vehicles with heavily armed elements, including prominent ex-Séléka FPRC members Abdoulaye Hissène, Haroun Gaye and Hamit Tidjani, attempted to depart Bangui, reportedly to attend the Bria assembly, forcing its passage in an exchange of fire with local security forces on the outskirts of Bangui. The convoy was intercepted on 13 August by MINUSCA,

27 km south of Sibut, Kémo prefecture. Four wounded ex-Séléka members, including FPRC leader Hamit Tidjani, were apprehended and moved to the MINUSCA level II hospital in Bangui with the agreement of the Central African judicial authorities. A total of 11 intercepted ex-Séléka fugitives have since been handed over to the national authorities in Bangui and were subsequently detained at Camp de Roux. On 3 September, some remaining ex-Séléka fugitives clashed with the local population 7 km north of Dékoa, Kémo prefecture, resulting in three deaths (two civilians and one ex-Séléka fugitive). MINUSCA has continued the search for the remaining fugitives and the Government has repeatedly called on them to disarm and surrender in order to face trial.

19. In the western part of the country, attacks and exactions against civilians continued, owing to the strong presence of anti-balaka. In the north-western part of the country, security issues associated with the seasonal movement of Fulani pastoralists peaked in the month of May, with the most violent incidents reported along the country's transhumance corridors in Ouham prefecture. The presence of armed groups claiming to protect mainly Fulani pastoralists, among others, in particular Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R), FPRC and MPC, further aggravated tensions, resulting in clashes with anti-balaka and the Front démocratique pour le peuple centrafricain (FDPC), for whom cattle theft is a significant source of income.

20. In the central and north-eastern part of the country, ex-Séléka factions continued to compete for expanded control over illegal taxation schemes. In Bambari, the situation became increasingly tense as a result of infighting between Arab dissidents under UPC leader Abdoulaye Faya and Fulani elements loyal to UPC leader Ali Darassa. Following clashes between both factions on 4 July that resulted in 14 UPC fatalities, 34 dissidents, including Abdoulaye Faya, sought shelter in the MINUSCA camp. The group agreed to enter into the pre-disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and was transferred to Kaga-Bandoro on 2 September, but the dissidents have yet to honour their commitment.

21. In the south-eastern part of the country, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) continued to pose a threat to the population, with 143 abductions reported in Haute-Kotto, Haut-Mbomou, and Mbomou (mainly around Rafaï) prefectures during the reporting period. On 17 April, a MINUSCA peacekeeper was killed in Rafaï by unknown assailants while trying to rescue a presumed LRA member from being lynched by a mob. On 7 June, tensions rose in Zémio, Haut-Mbomou prefecture, between the local population and the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) troops serving under the African Union Regional Task Force following the arrest of one civilian by the local gendarmerie over a case involving a stolen UPDF weapon. The incident led to the death of a UPDF soldier, allegedly stabbed by locals, and the subsequent killing of a civilian by a UPDF soldier in retaliation, prompting demonstrations by the local population in Obo and Zémio. On 25 August, one UPDF soldier was killed and two wounded in an attack by LRA elements near Keteisa village, Haut-Mbomou prefecture, 60 km north-east of Zémio. This was the first case of UPDF casualties caused directly by counter-LRA operations in three years. Pursuant to its mandate to protect civilians, MINUSCA reinforced its presence in LRA-affected areas and strengthened its information-gathering activities with the Regional Task Force. On 20 May, the Government of Uganda announced its

intention to withdraw its forces from the Regional Task Force by the end of December 2016.

C. Reconciliation

22. The Government has not endorsed a national reconciliation strategy or initiated concrete activities to foster dialogue between communities, although the President has repeatedly and publicly espoused his commitment to this priority objective. During the reporting period, the United Nations continued advocating with the Government to adopt a strategy on national reconciliation that fosters dialogue between communities. On 27 June, following heightened intercommunal tensions in Bangui, the President hosted an Iftar dinner to commemorate Ramadan as part of efforts to reduce tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim communities. It was the first time a Head of State had hosted a Muslim holiday in the Central African Republic. The President also visited the Muslim-dominated PK-5 neighbourhood to celebrate the Eid al-Adha holiday.

23. MINUSCA, together with the United Nations country team and international partners, supported a number of local dialogue initiatives by national stakeholders, including members of civil society, to address communal tensions over internal and cross-border transhumance issues, the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and threats posed to communities by armed groups. MINUSCA and its partners also supported communities in seven locations across the country to create local peace committees to address restrictions on freedom of movement and promote coexistence among different communities. Some members of the Muslim community thereafter voluntarily returned to their former homes in Carnot, Mambéré-Kadéï prefecture.

24. MINUSCA, the United Nations country team, local authorities and members of civil society continued to carry out initiatives to address young people at risk in Bambari, Bangui, Bouar, Bria and Kaga-Bandoro, with the aim of reducing the appeal of membership in armed groups through the acquisition of income-generating vocational skills. Some 13,000 young people, of whom 31 per cent were women, participated.

III. Protection of civilians

25. The protection of civilians remains a major concern, and State capacity to prevent and respond to protection incidents remains weak. MINUSCA organized 14 community alert network workshops throughout the country, while some 700 community alert network focal points received training and contributed to the development of community protection plans. MINUSCA also enhanced its coordination, training, planning and joint protection actions with national and local authorities in priority protection locations throughout the country, with the aim of building the State's capacity to address threats against civilian populations. For instance, following insecurity triggered in June 2016 by the arrival of MPC elements in Ngaoundaye, Ouham-Pendé prefecture, national gendarmerie and MINUSCA were deployed, followed by a joint protection team visit led by the office of the Prime Minister. Subsequent reconciliation activities in the area were

successfully conducted with local authorities. In addition, MINUSCA continued to support the establishment of local security committees in priority areas in Bangui, while also developing a strategic communications plan both aimed at perpetrators and intended to promote awareness on the protection of civilians, including with respect to accusations of witchcraft and the mitigation of protection-related risks posed by transhumance.

26. During the reporting period, MINUSCA carried out 18 joint protection team missions in response to protection concerns in priority areas throughout the country. Such missions by the joint protection team involved a wide array of efforts, including negotiating the release of civilians held for over a year by FDPC around Zoukombo (Nana-Mambéré); extracting individuals, particularly Fulani women and children, held against their will by anti-balaka in Baoro (Haut-Mbomou), Ndim (Ouham-Pendé) and Yaloké (Ombella-M'Poko); curtailing a UPC advance and exactions in Basse-Kotto and Haute-Kotto prefectures by recommending that the Mission take a robust posture; recommending proactive deployments and interposition by MINUSCA between anti-balaka and 3R forces in Besson (Nana-Mambéré) and Koui (Ouham-Pendé); and performing mediation to de-escalate threats to Fulani and other civilians at risk of reprisals following tensions between MPC/FPRC and UPC factions in Bambari, Batangafo, Kabo, Kaga-Bandoro and Ouandago.

27. The Mission has now deployed a total of 52 community liaison assistants in 35 temporary operating bases and 11 offices across the country and has continued to provide integrated protection training to incoming military and police field commanders so as to increase local community capacities and ownership in their own protection.

IV. Human rights situation

A. Violations by anti-balaka and ex-Séléka and other armed groups, including the Lord's Resistance Army, and national and international armed forces

28. The human rights situation remained a cause for concern throughout the country during the reporting period. MINUSCA documented 513 human rights incidents or abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law committed against 1,387 victims, including 89 women, 56 boys, and 11 girls. The violations were mainly arbitrary killings and cases of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, conflict-related sexual violence and arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as abductions. The Mission also documented 27 cases of human rights violations and abuses related to allegations of witchcraft, affecting 57 victims, mainly women and children. Armed groups committed 341 abuses, 59 of which were attributed to anti-balaka, 178 to ex-Séléka and 40 to LRA. State authorities were responsible for 171 violations, the majority of which involved arbitrary or illegal detention, with the gendarmerie (73) as the main perpetrator. MINUSCA documented one case of a violation by international forces, in which a UPDF element was the perpetrator.

29. Most of the alleged violations were committed in the central and north-eastern prefectures of Bamingui-Bangoran, Haute-Kotto, Nana-Grébizi, Ouaka and Ouham. Arbitrary detentions increased, particularly in Bangui and in Mambéré-Kadéï and Ombella-M'Poko prefectures, with regular detention extending beyond the 72-hour legal limit, renewable once, for holding suspects in cells. This was owing to the lack of a functioning national judicial system in addition to logistical constraints. Two cases of extrajudicial killings were allegedly committed by police officers from the Central African Office for the Suppression of Banditry in April. The cases followed previous allegations of extrajudicial killings implicating the director of the Central Office, who was removed from his position on 8 June. MINUSCA continued to call for an investigation and prosecution in that case.

30. MINUSCA provided 59 human rights awareness training sessions to 2,762 participants, 598 of whom were women. Participants included government officials, civil society representatives, journalists, human rights defenders and representatives of armed groups. The Mission also conducted four workshops with representatives of the Government, the civil service and civil society with respect to the establishment of a national commission for human rights and fundamental liberties, as well as a truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation commission.

31. A total of 41 out of 50 requests for support to non-United Nations security forces, including members of armed groups, were approved, with necessary risk mitigation measures recommended when appropriate, in accordance with the human rights due diligence policy instituted by the Secretary-General. Three letters were sent to the Central African authorities, resulting in the suspension of United Nations support to a police unit and the subsequent removal of its director.

B. Conflict-related sexual violence

32. During the reporting period, MINUSCA registered 44 allegations of conflict-related sexual violence throughout the country, 25 of which were investigated and verified. The victims comprised 22 women, 21 girls and 1 boy. Twenty-seven of the cases involved rape, while 17 involved attempted rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage and/or sexual assault. Of the 27 cases of rape, 16 were perpetrated by multiple actors and 5 occurred in the context of sexual slavery. Of the 44 registered cases, 20 were allegedly perpetrated by ex-Séléka or affiliated groups, 14 by anti-balaka, 9 by LRA elements and 1 by unidentified perpetrators. The actual number of incidents of conflict-related sexual violence is suspected to be much higher than the number reported.

33. The Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict, of the Office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, visited Bangui in June and urged the Government to appoint national police and gendarmerie officers as part of a rapid response unit to address sexual violence crimes.

C. Child protection

34. The United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting documented the recruitment of 33 children (including 7 girls) into armed groups, the abduction of 22 children (including 5 girls), the killing of 12 children (including 6 girls), the raping of 21 girls, and sexual violence against 1 boy. There were 26 incidents of denial of humanitarian access that impeded delivery of assistance to children. In 15 separate incidents, the use of schools and hospitals by armed groups deprived children of education and health care.

35. MINUSCA continued its engagement with armed groups to address grave violations of child rights and to obtain the release of children associated with such groups. In April and May, FPRC, MPC, UPC and RPRC leaders reiterated their commitment to MINUSCA and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to ending violations against children, pledging to sign related action plans. During the reported period, 612 children, including 89 girls, were separated from anti-balaka and FPRC elements.

36. In cooperation with UNICEF, MINUSCA carried out training and awareness-raising activities on child protection for 1,625 participants, consisting of 550 peacekeepers and 1,075 representatives of armed groups, civil society, the national police and the gendarmerie. MINUSCA continued to advocate with the Government to treat children associated with armed groups as victims of conflict and has urged that the final steps of ratification be completed for the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.

V. Humanitarian situation

37. The humanitarian situation remained dire, with more than 2.3 million of the 4.8 million Central Africans still dependent on humanitarian assistance. As at 15 September, there were 452,095 refugees in neighbouring countries and 385,750 internally displaced persons, of which some 150,156 live at 92 sites throughout the country. Over 36,000 people from minority groups remained at risk in Berbérati, Boda, Bouar, Carnot, Dékoa, Yaloké and the PK-5 neighbourhood of Bangui. The spontaneous return of a small number of internally displaced persons due to an improved security situation caused renewed intercommunal tension in some areas, especially in the south-western part of the country. The Central African Republic is also hosting 11,928 refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and the Sudan.

38. Humanitarian access to affected people remained constrained by logistical and security challenges, with recurrent attacks on humanitarian actors. Attacks by and hostilities between armed groups, in addition to conflicts related to transhumance, caused new displacements.

39. Two thirds of Central Africans have no access to health care, safe drinking water or sanitation facilities, while the country is regularly exposed to epidemic outbreaks such as measles, rabies and meningitis. International humanitarian actors, which support the majority of social services, faced serious funding challenges with

adverse effects on critical humanitarian activities. The Humanitarian Response Plan requiring $531.5 million is only 28 per cent funded.

40. On 10 August, the Government declared a cholera epidemic in Kémo prefecture, with 266 reported cases resulting in 21 deaths at the time of writing. UNICEF, the World Health Organization and other humanitarian actors mobilized resources to sensitize the population and to provide at-risk areas with medicine, potable water and sanitary equipment, including by engaging with the Ministry of Health of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

VI. Socioeconomic developments

41. The economic outlook foresees a 5.2 per cent economic growth rate for 2016. The country recorded a 4.5 per cent growth rate in 2015, compared with 1 per cent in 2014. The inflation rate dropped to 4.5 per cent in the first half of 2015. The internal revenue forecast for 2016 amounted to $140 million. Public sector debt remains high, despite a drop from $8.7 million in 2014 to an expected $7.1 million in 2016. Dependence on external aid decreased but remained high in 2015, at 27 per cent of GDP, as compared with 43 per cent of GDP in 2014. The Central African authorities have expressed their commitment to sustaining this trend through a review of tax policies and better management of natural resources. On 20 July, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund approved a three-year funding facility of $115.4 million for the Central African Republic under the Extended Credit Facility, with an immediate disbursement of $17.4 million to restore macroeconomic stability. Financial needs are expected to decline from 4.8 per cent of GDP in 2016 to 3.2 per cent in 2019 if the trend towards peace consolidation continues.

42. Following the decision reached at a meeting of the Kimberley Process, held in July 2015, to allow the resumption of trade in rough diamonds from compliant zones, MINUSCA provided logistical and substantial support during the reporting period to two Kimberley Process review missions to various locations in the south-western part of the country. During these review missions, progress was assessed in terms of compliance with the three key Kimberley Process benchmarks for compliant zones: (a) sufficient presence of State authority; (b) free movement of people and goods; and (c) no systematic presence of armed groups.

VII. Extension of State authority

43. MINUSCA and international partners provided technical expertise to the newly formed Ministry of the Interior, Public Security and Territorial Administration, including developing synergies between the Ministry's civilian and uniformed personnel and a common vision for the Ministry. In July, MINUSCA facilitated a preparatory workshop to support the Government in designing an integrated strategy for the extension of State authority. MINUSCA also supported a UNDP-initiated survey, funded by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, on the redeployment and presence of public administration in the prefectures, as well as the development of a handbook for newly deployed administrative authorities and

civil servants on local governance, ethics and combating corruption. To strengthen national security institutions and enhance their capacity, MINUSCA conducted targeted training of 513 police and gendarmerie officers in Bangui and Bouar, including 134 women, with the aim of strengthening judicial police skills, investigation techniques, community policing and responses to gender-based violence.

VIII. Rule of law

A. Implementation of urgent temporary measures

44. The President continues to express the will of his Government to fight impunity and has requested assistance from MINUSCA, supported by the execution of arrest warrants. During the reporting period, MINUSCA assisted the national authorities in the fight against impunity through 112 arrests and/or apprehensions, 49 of which were carried out under the Mission's mandate to take urgent temporary measures. The arrest and/or apprehension and detention of suspects has been particularly challenging in areas without detention facilities or State authorities to which a suspect may be handed over. Despite these obstacles, such arrests and/or apprehensions often contributed to a reduction in threats from the targeted armed groups. MINUSCA also provided technical assistance for 14 criminal cases against high-profile suspects, whose trials commenced on 25 August and were expected to conclude on 23 September.

45. On 21 June, the National Prosecutor requested support from MINUSCA in arresting six high-level individuals affiliated with ex-Séléka. They remain at large, but MINUSCA supported the strengthening of the case files against them. On 19 August, MINUSCA apprehended and handed over another ex-Séléka leader, Hamit Tidjani. Meanwhile, on 5 August, Jean-Francis Bozizé, former Minister of Defence and a son of the former President, François Bozizé, was apprehended by MINUSCA and handed over to national authorities pursuant to an outstanding national arrest warrant against him. He was subsequently arraigned by national authorities, which ordered his provisional release on a number of conditions, including that he remain at his residence. In line with resolution 2301 (2016), MINUSCA is developing a list of persons suspected of serious crimes and/or who pose a serious threat to security. The list is expected to provide a basis for prosecution of serious crimes by national justice institutions, including the Special Criminal Court.

B. Special Criminal Court

46. MINUSCA, together with the United Nations country team and international partners, continued to support the establishment of the Special Criminal Court, which saw some progress during the reporting period. The Government advanced slowly on the establishment of the Court, with the Minister of Justice approving the terms of reference and selection procedures for the international magistrates and the Deputy Registrar. The Minister also allocated new premises for the Court and

established a committee for the selection of national personnel, which has met four times and is progressing towards the proposal of candidates.

47. On 26 August, the Government, MINUSCA and UNDP signed an agreement for a United Nations project in support of the Special Criminal Court. International partners have either pledged contributions or agreed to support the nomination of international magistrates. While the committee established to appoint national magistrates has not yet initiated the selection process, the Minister of Justice declared his intention to deploy the Special Prosecutor before the end of the year. The first 14 months of the Court's operations are nearly fully funded, including the support to be provided by MINUSCA to the Court through the Mission's funding programme.

C. Justice and the rule of law

48. The Government and the national judiciary system have taken steps to increase the number of trials throughout the country, including criminal sessions in Bangui. MINUSCA continued to undertake capacity-building efforts for justice and corrections personnel, and supported criminal proceedings at the Bangui Court of Appeal in 58 cases. MINUSCA also provided assistance to national authorities for the training of magistrates, including the organization of the first competency-based exams for the recruitment of new magistrates, a key step towards enhancing the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary. To promote the legal assistance system, MINUSCA supported national authorities in developing a strategic plan for the Bar Association, trained 30 paralegals and provided advice and financial support for the National School for Administration and Magistrates.

49. Despite MINUSCA and UNDP support in the initial rehabilitation of 23 courts and the redeployment of magistrates to resume judicial activities outside Bangui, progress remained limited. While criminal trials have fully resumed in Bangui and partly in the western part of the country, some judges and prosecutors have left their posts owing to security concerns and the difficult working conditions. In some areas under the control of armed groups, the gap in basic justice services has been filled by parallel justice systems established by armed groups and/or religious leaders, while in a few areas, both local authorities and armed groups opposed the redeployment of magistrates.

50. MINUSCA continued to support the prison system and a limited number of experienced prison personnel through active support provided to the oversight and management of high-risk prisoners in Ngaragba prison in Bangui and its annex, Camp de Roux. The demilitarization of the prison system remains a priority, with a focus on establishing a civilian prison structure, including a new recruitment process and training programmes for both new recruits and existing personnel. During the reporting period, MINUSCA trained 175 members of the Central African armed forces and 41 national prison staff members on basic rule of law procedures. The Mission also rehabilitated and handed over three prisons, Bambari, Bossembele and Camp de Roux in Bangui, to national authorities.

IX. Security sector reform and vetting

51. The Minister Counsellor and Special Coordinator for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration, security sector reform and national reconciliation presented the national security sector reform priorities at a high-level dialogue event of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform facilitated by the Secretariat in New York on 21 and 22 June. In their statement, the co-chairs of the Group underlined the need for strong political commitment on security sector reform to prevent a relapse into conflict, called for the establishment of a national policy and governance framework for the security sector, and underscored the need for coordination of international support within a framework of mutual accountability.

52. The European Union Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic concluded its mandate on 16 July. The European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic was established on 12 July with the mandate to play a critical role in defence sector reform and provide strategic advice to national authorities and training to vetted Central African armed forces.

53. In August, a Government-appointed ad hoc national technical committee reviewed and validated the national security policy, following two workshops facilitated by MINUSCA. The national authorities also established a drafting committee to develop a national security sector reform strategy, with support from MINUSCA and the Military Training Mission. A capacity-building and development plan for the internal security forces (police and gendarmerie) was finalized at a technical workshop held from 22 to 26 August, organized with the support of UNDP, the European Union, the African Union, France and the United States of America. The plan constitutes a sectoral reform plan for police and gendarmerie and outlines key reforms to be undertaken in the next five years.

54. During this period, MINUSCA began the rehabilitation of the Camp Leclerc military training centre in Bouar and continued to support the rehabilitation of Camp Kassai in Bangui. MINUSCA, in close coordination with the Military Advisory Mission and later with the Military Training Mission, conducted non-operational training for 167 officers and non-commissioned officers of the Central African armed forces.

55. As at 15 September, the human resources directorate at the Ministry of Defence had registered 7,478 members of the Central African armed forces, of whom 3,533 had been verified by MINUSCA. A joint task force of UNDP, MINUSCA, national police and gendarmerie undertook an identification exercise among the internal security forces, which resulted in the registration of 1,874 gendarmes and 1,154 police.

X. Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration

56. MINUSCA continued to encourage dialogue between the Government and armed groups in order to support the launch of the national disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme. During the reporting period, the Government expanded discussions on disarmament, demobilization and

reintegration to include 5 non-signatory armed groups in addition to the 9 signatories to the agreement stemming from the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation of May 2015, bringing the total number of armed groups expected to participate in the national programme to 14. Subsequently, the Government-designated representatives of each of the 14 armed groups were appointed on 24 August to participate in the advisory and monitoring committee of the national programme. However, some armed group leaders are rejecting the designation of specific Government appointees.

57. In support of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts, MINUSCA reinforced its technical assistance to the Office of the Special Coordinator for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration, security sector reform and national reconciliation. In close collaboration with development partners, in particular the World Bank, MINUSCA contributed to the development of a new institutional framework for a multi-year national disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme. The draft national strategy for such a programme is currently under review by the Government.

58. Furthermore, MINUSCA has been developing options for limited integration of armed group members into the national security forces, in line with article 7 of the Bangui Forum agreement on disarmament, demobilization and repatriation principles. On 21 July, the Government announced the establishment of a working group on integration issues, which the Mission intends to support as a means to encourage consensus among armed groups and the Government.

59. The pre-disarmament, demobilization and repatriation programme continued to serve as a stabilization measure by engaging armed groups in paid community-based projects until the launch of the national disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme. In this respect, MINUSCA pursued pre-disarmament, demobilization and repatriation operations in Bambari, Bangui, Birao, Bouar, Bria and Kaga-Bandoro and launched operations in Bossangoa and Ndélé. These operations were aimed at nearly 4,000 beneficiaries, of whom approximately 16 per cent were women, who received food on a weekly basis and participated in short-term labour-intensive activities that injected needed cash into local economies.

60. To bolster the stabilizing impact of the pre-disarmament, demobilization and repatriation programme and the planned national disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme, MINUSCA, together with the United Nations country team and with financial support from the Peacebuilding Fund, continued to support community violence reduction projects targeting both combatants deemed ineligible for disarmament, demobilization and repatriation and community members in general, including young people at risk of violence. In Ouham-Pendé prefecture, MINUSCA registered over 4,000 beneficiaries, of whom 25 per cent were women. In and around Bangui, MINUSCA launched a project for 3,000 participants.

XI. Weapons and ammunition management

61. MINUSCA, through the United Nations Mine Action Service, destroyed 2,192 items of unexploded ordnance, 62,516 items of small arms ammunition, 156,000

detonators and 63 tons of commercial explosives. MINUSCA established a temporary ammunition storage facility at Camp Kassai in Bangui, to store ammunition marked for future destruction, and installed a container for safe weapons storage for a gendarmerie unit. MINUSCA also supported national authorities in improving weapons and ammunition storage in line with basic international standards in five police buildings and one customs post. MINUSCA conducted 2,308 awareness training sessions on the risks of weapons and explosives and on reducing armed violence for 92,432 beneficiaries throughout the country.

XII. Coordination of international assistance

62. Under the leadership of the Ministry of the Economy, Planning and Cooperation, and with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank, the technical work for preparing the national strategy for recovery and peace consolidation began in June. The document outlining the Government's three-year peace-building strategy will serve as the resource mobilization tool to be used during the donors' conference scheduled to be held in Brussels on 17 November 2016.

63. On 17 May, the Prime Minister issued a decree establishing a technical committee to develop a framework of mutual accountability with the international community, in coordination with and supported by MINUSCA. The committee began its work on 26 May and established a working group, through which a zero draft of the proposed framework for mutual engagement was submitted for approval to the technical committee on 15 June. On 23 September, during a ministerial meeting hosted in New York on the margins of the general debate of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, the President announced his intention to finalize the framework before the convening, in Brussels on 17 November, of the international conference on the Central African Republic.

XIII. Deployment of the Mission

A. Military

64. At the time of writing, MINUSCA had deployed 10,515 military personnel, or 97.8 per cent of its authorized strength of 10,750. This included 11 infantry battalions, one special forces company and several enabling units, including one military police unit, four engineering companies, one heavy transport company, three level II hospitals, three signal companies and three helicopter units, one of which is a combat helicopter unit. Troop-contributing countries have further improved the equipment of their contingents. In the reporting period, the Mission maintained 44 operating bases, comprising 34 permanent and 10 temporary bases. The Mission will adjust its military enabling capabilities by repatriating two of its three signal units and generating an additional engineering unit. It also continued to adjust its posture, including by reducing the number of bases, in order to provide greater flexibility, mobility and capacity to deter and counter threats and to support the comprehensive approach towards the armed groups.

B. Police

65. MINUSCA maintained an authorized strength of 2,080 police personnel, including 378 individual police officers (94.5 per cent of the authorized strength of 400), 1,400 formed police unit personnel (83 per cent of the authorized strength of 1,680) and 280 protection support unit personnel. At the time of writing, MINUSCA had deployed 90 police officers throughout the country: 23 in Bouar, 16 in Bria, 16 in Kaga-Bandoro, and 5 each in Bambari, Bangassou, Berbérati, Bossangoa, Ndélé, Obo and Paoua. In Bangui, the Mission deployed 288 police officers to various units, including 100 in mobile teams and for collocation with the national police and gendarmerie. Two Burundi-formed police units ended their deployment at the end of July, at the request of the United Nations; their replacements have not yet been deployed.

C. Civilian personnel

66. As at 15 September, MINUSCA had a total of 1,148 civilian personnel deployed (67 per cent of the authorized staffing), comprising 608 international posts, 383 national posts and 157 United Nations Volunteers positions. This is inclusive of the 206 new positions authorized for the period 2016/17. Women constituted 25 per cent of civilian personnel deployed.

D. Status-of-forces agreement

67. The Central African Republic authorities made efforts to resolve issues pertaining to the status-of-forces agreement. Although in a few instances the Government had attempted to reinstate the fuci tax, it recently confirmed that MINUSCA had been granted the exemption in conformity with the agreement. At the time of writing, the Government had collected $8.15 million in tax reimbursements from the United Nations, covering the period from April 2015 to June 2016, which is in violation of the agreement and which the Secretariat is attempting to recover. Other issues pertaining to the registration fee of 12 per cent per annum on residential leases and the 2 per cent tax on salaries and emoluments paid in cash and carried by civilian personnel when leaving the Central African Republic had also not been formally resolved. During the reporting period, MINUSCA and other United Nations agencies in the country experienced 22 cases in which Central African defence or internal security forces inhibited freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and/or assets. MINUSCA is engaging with the authorities on this issue.

XIV. Safety and security of United Nations personnel

68. The protection of United Nations personnel remained challenging as civilian and uniformed personnel continued to face threats posed by general insecurity and criminality. During the reporting period, 22 security incidents involving United Nations civilian personnel occurred, affecting 16 civilian personnel, none resulting in any deaths. One Central African casual day worker was temporarily detained illegally by ex-Séléka elements. Seven peacekeepers lost their lives during the reporting period:

one in Rafaï on 17 April and another in Bangui on 24 June; two in traffic accidents; and three as a result of illness (malaria). There were 13 attacks against humanitarian non-governmental organizations, resulting in the deaths of three humanitarian workers. Criminality and social disturbances continued to pose threats and security risks to United Nations staff, premises and operations. The illegal detention of six national police officers in the PK-5 neighbourhood in Bangui by a self-defence group on 20 June resulted in 12 United Nations vehicles being attacked and damaged.

XV. Serious misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse

69. During the reporting period, MINUSCA received 16 serious misconduct complaints, including 11 relating to sexual exploitation and abuse, of which 1 involved a United Nations contractor and 6 referred to older incidents committed before 2014 by troops serving under the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic.

70. The Special Coordinator on Improving the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse visited MINUSCA from 7 to 11 April and met with Mission leadership and uniformed and civilian personnel involved in the prevention of and response to sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as representatives of the United Nations country team and international non-governmental organizations.

71. MINUSCA intensified its efforts to reduce misconduct and sexual exploitation and abuse by undertaking regular risk assessment visits to the accommodation sites of uniformed personnel, sending out patrols, and providing bimonthly induction and specialized training for uniformed personnel and sexual exploitation and abuse focal points, including in relation to the conduct of investigations by immediate response teams. In coordination with local authorities, religious and community leaders, young people and women's groups, MINUSCA conducted outreach activities on sexual exploitation and abuse to local communities living in the vicinity of military barracks and established joint prevention teams, comprising uniformed and civilian personnel from MINUSCA and other United Nations agencies. National investigation officers within each military contingent were appointed and underwent specialized training on United Nations standards of conduct and the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, in line with the applicable memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and troop- and police-contributing countries.

XVI. Financial Aspects

72. The General Assembly, pursuant to its resolution 70/271, appropriated the amount of $920.7 million for the maintenance of MINUSCA for the period 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017.

XVII. Observations

73. Since my previous progress report, the Central African Republic has turned a critical corner. The inauguration of a democratically elected President, his articulation of an ambitious vision for the transformation of the country, the

formation of an inclusive Government and the full operationalization of the National Assembly represent major milestones. Yet, many of the root causes of the crisis remain unaddressed, and the past few months have showcased the magnitude of the challenges ahead. It is crucial to accelerate concrete actions to bring tangible and sustainable improvements to people's lives. I encourage President Faustin-Archange Touadéra and his Government to continue on this path and to work in a spirit of inclusivity, focusing on national priorities that are representative of the hopes and aspirations of all Central Africans. In order for reconciliation to take hold, State institutions and actors must be representative of and accountable to all citizens, and be perceived as such. The long-term stability of the country depends on addressing the political, social and economic grievances of large segments of society. This will require dedication and time. However, it is of key importance to lay sound foundations for these efforts now, through concrete and visible actions.

74. I applaud the President's efforts to engage with the armed groups and to develop a national programme on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration. I encourage the national authorities to build on these efforts through comprehensive dialogue with the armed groups and local populations and by building on the principles and outcomes of the Bangui Forum. I urge the armed groups to engage in this process in good faith and in a spirit of finding a consensus to ensure lasting peace. I welcome the support pledged to the programme by partners, in particular the World Bank. In line with its new mandated strategic objective, MINUSCA will fully support these efforts through a comprehensive approach, including by facilitating dialogue with the armed groups as required, adopting a robust posture to address any threat to the process by potential spoilers, and supporting efforts to address long-standing grievances, consistent with the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 2301 (2016).

75. Accelerated reforms in the security and defence sector are an essential element of the comprehensive approach towards the armed groups and are key to creating the conditions for lasting peace. I welcome the President's commitment to reforming the security sector, which MINUSCA is committed to helping to translate into reality. I urge the Government to undertake the reform of the security sector in a spirit of inclusivity with the view to establishing security forces that are balanced, professional and representative of all Central Africans. I also call on the national authorities to endorse the draft national security policy and to undertake the vetting of the defence and security forces, including human rights vetting. The transformation of the defence forces is of particular importance, and I welcome the establishment of the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic, which should play a leading role in this regard, within the framework of broader security sector reform efforts.

76. The urgent reform of the national police and gendarmerie is of paramount importance to ensure that internal security forces assume primary responsibility for the safety and security of all Central Africans. I salute the commitment of the national authorities in this regard and their efforts to finalize the police and gendarmerie capability development plan. MINUSCA intends to rapidly assume its leading role in supporting the Government on the reform and development of the police and gendarmerie, with the support of donors and the United Nations country team. I urge international partners to support these efforts.

77. I am encouraged by local dialogue initiatives to address intercommunal tensions and foster reconciliation and social cohesion. I applaud the work carried out by religious platforms in heading off deep intercommunal divisions. However, I remain concerned about the prevailing intercommunal divisions and recurrent armed violence linked to them, which risk deteriorating into renewed, large-scale conflict. Of equal concern is the persistent sense of marginalization felt by certain minority groups, including in recent instances where their freedom of movement has been impeded. I urge the Government to adopt a national reconciliation strategy and to actively promote reconciliation at all levels of society to address the deep intercommunal divisions and ensure respect for the freedom of movement for all. The United Nations remains fully committed to supporting national actors in these efforts.

78. In order to achieve lasting peace and stability, national reconciliation and social cohesion must go hand in hand with efforts to fight impunity. I am concerned that the fight against impunity continues to be hampered by capacity constraints and structural and logistical constraints imposed by the judicial institutions, as well as by a lack of political will and allegations of double standards. The swift establishment of the Special Criminal Court remains a priority and I welcome the undertaking by the Government to select and appoint magistrates, in particular the Special Prosecutor, before the end of the year. These efforts should also be geared towards strengthening the national judicial system and be supported by the implementation of a human rights mapping effort to inventory the most serious human rights violations and the adoption of a balanced national prosecution strategy targeting all parties allegedly involved in serious crimes, as well as through programmes for the protection of victims and witnesses.

79. The challenges facing the Central African Republic remain daunting, but progress is being made. It will be important to ensure that the various aspects of peace consolidation and peacebuilding mentioned above are pursued in a concerted manner. In this regard, I welcome the continued commitment of regional and other international actors, who continue to play a critical role in peace consolidation efforts in the country. At the same time, expectations will need to be managed, and priorities set. I will regularly report on progress made towards the strategic objective and priorities set out in resolution 2301 (2016), and will continue to draw the attention of the international community to areas where further assistance is required.

80. I remain deeply concerned that, despite the progress made on the political and security front, the dire humanitarian situation in the country has not improved, and humanitarian aid delivery is hampered by continued attacks on humanitarian workers. Two thirds of the Central African people have no access to safe water or basic health care in an environment frequently exposed to epidemic outbreaks. Large segments of the population continue to be internally displaced, to be exposed to protection-related risks and to live in enclaves, while some 460,000 refugees have not yet been able to return home. I call upon all national actors to allow unhindered and safe access of humanitarian actors to those in need, including the most isolated and vulnerable populations. I urge the national authorities, with support from the humanitarian community, MINUSCA and international partners, to accelerate efforts to create the conditions for the safe and voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as to ensure their safety, freedom of movement and

basic rights. I call upon the international community to urgently bridge the financial gap in meeting the most basic humanitarian needs of the country.

81. The country has achieved remarkable progress in 2016. But the path towards lasting peace and stability will remain elusive without the unwavering support of the international community. The lack of investment, in both people and infrastructure, from which the Central African Republic has suffered must be reversed. This will require significant amounts of assistance until the country becomes self-reliant. Together, the Central African Republic's partners must ensure that the collective efforts and investments made so far are matched by continued, long-term engagement and the sustained provision of resources to address the root causes of the crisis, in close partnership with the Central Africans. In this regard, I welcome the initiative by the Central African authorities to develop a framework of mutual accountability that should help to solidify a durable partnership between the Central African Republic and its international partners so as to ensure sustained international engagement in the country. The recovery and peacebuilding needs of the Central African Republic, jointly supported by the United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank, also required the assistance of the wider international community. I urge Member States and regional and international organizations, including non-traditional donors to the country, to make generous contributions to the Central African Republic at the international conference to be held in Brussels on 17 November.

82. I wish to thank the President for attending the ministerial meeting chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General on the margins of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly in New York. The meeting helped to bring together some of the key partners of the Central African Republic to express support for the President's vision, while underlining the need to pursue an inclusive political process and to focus on essential stabilization priorities. It also helped to prepare for the meeting scheduled to be held in the coming weeks in Washington, D.C., which will focus on recovery and peacebuilding, as well as for the donors' conference to be convened by the European Union in November.

83. I am grateful to the Special Representative for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, for his tireless efforts in carrying out the Mission's mandate. I am deeply appreciative of the work carried out by the personnel of MINUSCA and the United Nations country team in a demanding environment. I am also grateful to my Special Representative for Central Africa, Abdoulaye Bathily, for his engagement in the subregion in coordination with MINUSCA. I am grateful to the European Union for its continued engagement, including through the deployment of the Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic. I thank the African Union, troop- and police-contributing countries, the Economic Community of Central African States, the World Bank, international partners and multilateral and non-governmental organizations for their continued engagement in working towards a better future for all Central Africans.

United Nations S/2016/824/Corr.1

Security Council

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13 October 2016
English
Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic

Corrigendum

Paragraph 16

For the existing text *substitute*

16. On 24 June, a MINUSCA peacekeeper in civilian clothing was killed in the 5th district of Bangui by a member of the Central African armed forces and was transported by unknown elements to the Bangui General Hospital, where he was later identified by MINUSCA. An investigation was opened by the national authorities on the instructions of the Public Prosecutor of Bangui and with MINUSCA support. While the case file has been completed by the national police and transmitted to the Prosecutor, the alleged perpetrator of the crime has not yet been apprehended and a verdict on the case remains pending. MINUSCA actively engaged the authorities on this issue and urged them to conclude the process.

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United Nations S/2016/825

Security Council

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30 September 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 29 September 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the thirty-sixth monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The report covers the period from 23 August to 22 September 2016.

On the matter of the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities declared by the Syrian Arab Republic, no progress has been made. I take note of the statement by the Director-General that the poor security situation on the ground is continuing to prevent safe access by either the Syrian Arab Republic or the OPCW secretariat to the remaining hangar and the two stationary above-ground facilities.

With regard to the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic and subsequent submissions, and since the time of my previous letter (S/2016/748), the Director-General has received a reply to his own letter to the Syrian National Authority, in which he urged the Syrian Arab Republic to provide scientifically and technically plausible explanations in response to a list of questions relating to various facets of its chemical weapons programme. In this regard, I note that the Syrian Arab Republic has addressed some of the questions raised, but that the OPCW secretariat intends to follow up with further questions.

It is with great concern that I must once again recall the continuing allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in addition to my grave concern at the apparent erosion of the taboo against their use in this conflict. International norms cannot be permitted to weaken any further and those responsible must be held accountable. I take note that the Director-General of OPCW dispatched a team to Damascus from 4 to 9 September 2016 and that it continues to collect and study all available information relating to recent allegations.

The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism submitted its third report to the Security Council on 24 August 2016 (S/2016/738/Rev.1), pursuant to resolution 2235 (2015). In that report, the Leadership Panel recommended further investigations into three cases: Kafr Zita (18 April 2014), Qmenas (16 March 2015) and Binnish (24 March 2015). During the reporting period, the Mechanism continued to investigate those three cases, including by receiving and analysing information, such as forensics, that had been requested before the submission of the report.

On 15 September 2016, I indicated to the Security Council that the Mechanism required additional time to complete its report to the Council. The Council, in these exceptional circumstances, approved the request and granted a short extension of the mandate, until 31 October. The Mechanism intends to submit its fourth, and final, report to the Council on 21 October, which will include the assessment of the Leadership Panel and conclusions on the three remaining cases.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

Annex

Letter dated 26 September 2016 from the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme", prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 August to 22 September 2016 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

(*Signed*) Ahmet Üzümcü

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Note by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") is to report to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also to be submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.

2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities" (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation "in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1".

3. The Council, at its Forty-Eighth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria" (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015) noting the Director-General's intent to include reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) in Syria, along with information on the Council's discussion thereof, as part of the monthly reporting pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Similarly, the Council, at its Eighty-First Session, adopted a decision entitled "Report by the Director-General Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic" (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016) noting the Director-General's intent to provide information on the implementation of that decision.

4. This, the thirty-sixth monthly report, is therefore submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Council decisions, and includes information relevant to the period from 23 August to 22 September 2016.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

5. Progress by the Syrian Arab Republic is as follows:

(a) The Secretariat has verified the destruction of 24 of the 27 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. However, the poor security situation continues to prevent safe access both for the Syrian Arab Republic to destroy the remaining aircraft hangar, which stands ready

to accept the explosive charges, and for the Secretariat to confirm the condition of the two stationary above-ground facilities.

(b) On 14 September 2016, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the Council its thirty-fourth monthly report (EC-83/P/NAT.3, dated 14 September 2016) regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its CWPFs, as required by paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1.

Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities

6. As reported previously, all of the chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic that were removed from its territory in 2014 have now been destroyed.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decision EC-81/DEC.4

7. In an effort to make progress in clarifying the outstanding issues with regard to the Syrian Arab Republic's declaration, the Director-General addressed a letter dated 27 July 2016 to the Head of the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic. Through this letter, the Syrian Arab Republic was urged to provide scientifically and technically plausible explanations to a list of questions related to various facets of its chemical weapons programme.

8. A reply from the Syrian Arab Republic was received on 31 August 2016. In it, the Syrian Arab Republic provided some of the information with regard to the questions raised in in the Director-General's letter. The Secretariat is in the process of addressing an additional letter to the Syrian Arab Republic containing follow-up questions.

Other activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

9. As requested by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (paragraph 7.12 of EC-75/2, dated 7 March 2014), the Secretariat, on behalf of the Director-General, has continued to brief States Parties in The Hague on its activities.

10. As at the cut-off date of this report, one OPCW staff member was deployed as part of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Supplementary resources

11. As previously reported, a Trust Fund for Syria Missions was established in November 2015 to support the FFM and other remaining activities, such as those of the Declaration Assessment Team. As at the cut-off date of this report, contribution agreements totalling EUR 7.8 million had been concluded with Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Monaco, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States of America, and the European Union. Pledges from other donors have been made and are currently being processed.

Activities carried out with respect to the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria

12. The FFM continued to collect and study all available information relating to recent allegations of use of chemical weapons, with a particular focus on three alleged incidents in the Aleppo and Idlib Governorates of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The FFM's work will continue to be guided by Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 23 November 2015), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015).

13. As reported previously, the Secretariat received a note verbale from the Syrian Arab Republic on 16 August 2016 requesting the Director-General to dispatch a team to undertake an investigation of an alleged incident. In response to this request, a team was dispatched from 4 to 9 September 2016 to Damascus, where it was provided with a package of documentation and secured 19 samples gathered from the site of the alleged incident. The team is currently reviewing the documentation with a view to deploying for a further investigation in the near future.

14. The Head of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, under cover of a letter to the Director-General dated 30 August 2016, provided the third report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism and requested that the Council be informed thereof. The report was submitted to the United Nations Security Council on 24 August 2016 pursuant to Security Council resolution 2235 (2015), and has since been made available to the Council in accordance with paragraph 11 of that resolution.

Conclusion

15. The main focus of the future activities of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic will continue to be on the implementation of Council decision EC-81/DEC.4 and the activities of the FFM, as well as on the destruction and verification of the remaining aircraft hangar, confirmation of the status of the two stationary above-ground facilities, and annual inspections of the underground structures already verified as destroyed.

United Nations A/71/435–S/2016/826

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 34
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Identical letters dated 19 September 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of August 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-17275 (E) 111016 111016

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Annex to the identical letters dated 19 September 2016 from the Permanent Representative Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations committed in August 2016

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
4 August	2045	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Humvee vehicles fitted with searchlights intermittently directed those searchlights towards Lebanese territory as the patrol was travelling between the Salhah and Dovev positions to inspect the barbed-wire fence.
9 August	0900	From inside occupied Palestinian territory opposite the town of Udaysah, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle and a Defender vehicle approached, and five personnel disembarked to perform maintenance on the technical fence. Personnel from the patrol also aimed a 12.7 mm machine gun mounted on the Hummer vehicle towards Lebanese territory. At 1020 hours, the patrol left in the direction of occupied territory.
13 August	1445	At the Arid location opposite the Hasan Gate on the outskirts of Kafr Shuba, three members of an Israeli enemy patrol that was concealed inside the occupied Shab'a Farms violated the line of withdrawal (the Blue Line that demarcates area with regard to which Lebanon maintains a claim), crossing some 20 metres into Lebanese territory. They tried unsuccessfully to abduct the shepherd Jihad Dhiyab while the rest of the patrol took up combat positions inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
15 August	0800	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms opposite Birkat al-Naqqar, the Israeli enemy engaged in road-building and engineering work between observation points OP2 and OP3 belonging to the Indian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The enemy carried out the work using four excavators escorted by four Hummer vehicles, a personnel carrier and a Merkava tank. Some 50 personnel took up combat positions. The Israeli enemy finished its work at 1900 hours.
	1100	Inside occupied Palestinian territory opposite the Kafr Killa-Udaysah road, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle and a Defender vehicle approached. Eight personnel disembarked to perform maintenance on the technical fence without violating the Blue Line. Two of the patrol personnel aimed their weapons at a Lebanese Army patrol.
16 August	0740	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August outside the technical fence between the UNIFIL Indian contingent's observation points OP2 and OP3. The enemy carried out the work using four excavators escorted by four Hummer vehicles, a troop carrier and a Merkava tank. The Israeli enemy finished its work at 1900 hours.
17 August	1455 1730	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August inside the occupied Shab'a Farms outside the technical fence at the Saddanah location opposite the UNIFIL Indian contingent's observation point OP3. The enemy carried out the work using a bulldozer and a Poclain to level a stretch of approximately 550 metres of the Jabal Saddanah road.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2000	From inside occupied Palestinian territory opposite the town of Mays al-Jabal at the Ruwaysah position, the Israeli enemy positioned a Raccoon Stalker vehicle with a surveillance camera aimed towards Lebanese territory.
18 August	0800	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August outside the technical fence at the Saddanah location near the UNIFIL Indian contingent's observation point OP3 towards Birkat al-Naqqar. The enemy carried out the work using three excavators and a D9 bulldozer escorted by a Merkava tank and some 30 personnel. The bulldozer and excavators worked on the dirt road between the UNIFIL Indian contingent's observation point OP2 and Birkat al-Naqqar outside the technical fence, escorted by some 20 personnel. The Israeli enemy finished its work at 1745 hours.
21 August	0800	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August outside the technical fence at the Saddanah location near the UNIFIL Indian contingent's observation point OP3 towards Birkat al-Naqqar. The enemy carried out the work using four excavators and three D9 bulldozers escorted by three Merkava tanks and some 50 personnel. The Israeli enemy finished its work at 1900 hours.
	0845	Inside occupied territory opposite the town of Rumaysh between points B38-1 and B39 near the Khallat al-Budiyah-1 post, two jackhammer vehicles crossed the technical fence without violating the Blue Line in order to widen and smooth the dirt road. The Israeli enemy finished its work at 1940 hours, but the vehicles remained at the location.
22 August	0800	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August outside the technical fence at the Saddanah location near the UNIFIL Indian contingent's observation point OP3 towards Birkat al-Naqqar. The enemy carried out the work using four excavators and three D9 bulldozers escorted by two Merkava tanks, five Defender vehicles, five Hummer vehicles and some 50 personnel, who took up combat positions. The Israeli enemy finished its work at 1900 hours.
	1830	Several explosions were heard inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
23 August	0800	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August outside the technical fence at the Saddanah and Jabal al-Shahal locations towards Birkat al-Naqqar. The enemy carried out the work using 13 engineering vehicles escorted by three Merkava tanks, six Defender vehicles and six Hummer vehicles. The personnel deployed and took up combat positions. The Israeli enemy finished its work at 1900 hours.
24 August	0800	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August outside the technical fence at the Saddanah and Jabal al-Shahal locations towards Birkat al-Naqqar. The enemy carried out the work using a D9 bulldozer and six excavators escorted by two Merkava tanks, two Hummer vehicles and some 40 personnel who deployed and took up combat positions. The Israeli enemy finished its work at 1830 hours.
	1215	Several explosions were heard inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
25 August	0800	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August inside the occupied Shab'a Farms outside the technical fence at the Saddanah and Jabal al-Shahal locations. The enemy carried out the work using three D9 bulldozers and four excavators escorted by a hostile patrol comprising two Merkava tanks and six jeeps. The patrol personnel deployed on the surrounding hills and near where the work was being done. The enemy finished its work at the Saddanah location at 1300 hours, but continued working at the Jabal al-Shahal location until 1630 hours, after which the patrol and vehicles withdrew in the direction of occupied territory.
28 August	0800 1900	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August outside the technical fence at the Saddanah and Jabal al-Shahal locations. The enemy carried out the work using two D9 bulldozers and five excavators escorted by a hostile patrol comprising three Merkava tanks and six Defender vehicles. The patrol personnel deployed on the surrounding hills and near the locations where the work was being done. The Israeli enemy subsequently finished its work and the vehicles left in the direction of occupied territory.
29 August	0800	On the outskirts of the town of Abbasiyah-Hasbayya opposite the mosque, an Israeli enemy excavator extended its boom some three and a half metres over the technical fence to the line of withdrawal (the Blue Line that demarcates area with regard to which Lebanon maintains a claim). It smoothed over dirt and cleared dry brush. It was escorted by a hostile patrol comprising a Defender vehicle, a Hummer vehicle and a civilian vehicle. The Israeli enemy finished work at 1200 hours and the vehicles withdrew in the direction of occupied territory.
	0800 1930	The Israeli enemy continued the work it had begun outside the technical fence at the Saddanah and Jabal al-Shahal locations. The enemy carried out the work using two D9 bulldozers and four excavators escorted by a hostile patrol comprising six Defender vehicles and three Merkava tanks. The patrol personnel deployed on the surrounding hills and near the locations where the work was being done. A six-coil barbed-wire fence was laid along the road from observation point OP3 to Birkat al-Naqqar. The Israeli enemy then finished its work and the vehicles left in the direction of occupied territory.
	1230	Near observation point OP3, the Israeli enemy laid a barbed-wire fence on the road that it had built on 28 August.
31 August	0830	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August inside the occupied Shab'a Farms outside the technical fence at the Saddanah and Jabal Shahal locations. The enemy carried out the work using two D9 bulldozers, two excavators and 15 personnel, who installed a barbed-wire fence on the road between Birkat al-Naqqar and the UNIFIL Indian contingent's observation point OP3. They were escorted by a hostile patrol comprising two Merkava tanks, six jeeps and some 30 personnel. The enemy finished its work at 1600 hours and the patrol and vehicles left in the direction of occupied territory.

Sea violations committed in August 2016

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 August	1826	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011, for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 222 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
4 August	1830	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
5 August	0658	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 259 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1833	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a one-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 130 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
7 August	1933	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a four-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 150 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
10 August	1826	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2150	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 400 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
11 August	1828	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 205 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
12 August	0955	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
13 August	0005	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight and loudspeaker warnings at Lebanese fishing vessels, fired eight military-weapons rounds to warn off fishermen, and launched a flare.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0118	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a one-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 167 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0145 hours, it violated the boundary again, proceeding some 240 metres into Lebanese territorial waters for an eight-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
14 August	0411	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 370 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a seven-minute period, broadcasting over loudspeakers in Hebrew and sounding warning sirens. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0415	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period.
	0438	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 204 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0501	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 333 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a seven-minute period and broadcasting over loudspeakers in Hebrew. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0516	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a three-minute period.
	0519	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period.
15 August	1825	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
18 August	1819	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
19 August	0140	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a 10-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 150 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1834	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
21 August	1242	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
22 August	0555	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
25 August	0706	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a 39-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0805	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a 35-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0818	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a 22-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
26 August	0350	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 205 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0355 hours, it violated the boundary again, for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 150 metres. It also directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters and sounded warning sirens. The launch then left again in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0409 hours, it violated the boundary again, for a six-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 480 metres. It also released two charges into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0410	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch warned off two Lebanese fishing vessels with a loudspeaker and searchlight, and fired three military-weapons rounds in their direction over Lebanese territorial waters.
31 August	1850	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 150 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Air violations committed in August 2016

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 2330 hours over Rumaysh.
	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Jubayl and Kasrawan before leaving at 1430 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1230 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2310 hours over Naqurah.
2 August	1210	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1435 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1455	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Matn, Ba'abda, Beirut and Hirmil before leaving at 2325 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2210	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2310 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
3 August	1700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1920 hours over Yarun.
4 August	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh, It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 2220 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1900 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over Rumaysh.
	2100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0645 hours on 5 August over Rumaysh.
5 August	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0020 hours on 6 August over Naqurah.
	0935	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 0010 hours on 6 August over Kafr Killa.
	1005	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa, They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over Rumaysh.
	2350	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 0115 hours on 6 August over Kafr Killa.
6 August	0210	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1010 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1155	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 2145 hours over Kafr Killa.
8 August	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Zahlah and the South before leaving at 2200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1015	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa, They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
9 August	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1640 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0045 hours on 10 August over Rumaysh.
10 August	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Aytarun. It circled over Baalbek, Hirmil, Zahlah and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2055 hours over Rumaysh.
	0925	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1600 hours over Aytarun.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Alayh, Ba'abda and Matn before leaving at 1325 hours over Naqurah.
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1155 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South, Matn, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 0510 hours on 11 August over Naqurah.
11 August	0550	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Riyaq, Baalbek and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1045 hours over Rumaysh.
	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek, Zahlah and Hirmil before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	1020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1455 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1140	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1250 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1420	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1845 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2055 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2320 hours over Rumaysh.
12 August	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1930 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1530	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
13 August	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1815 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
14 August	1315	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1450 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1640	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1755 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1825	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0615 hours on 15 August over Rumaysh.
15 August	0835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1840 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2340 hours over Rumaysh.
16 August	0645	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1710 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1320	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 2300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
17 August	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Zahlah, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2320 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1540 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1450	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa, They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1555 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
18 August	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, the Western Bekaa, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2305 hours over Rumaysh.
	0755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1300 hours over Kafr Killa.
19 August	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1240 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2020 hours over Rumaysh.
	1355	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1710 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2335	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0630 hours on 20 August over Naqurah.
20 August	0105	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1645 hours over Rumaysh.
	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Shuf, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1600 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Shuf, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2000 hours over Kafr Killa.
21 August	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2215 hours over Kafr Killa.
22 August	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0925 hours over Rumaysh.
	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1830 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1615 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1215	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1315 hours over Naqurah.
	1220	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1420 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1855	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0645 hours on 23 August over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South, Baalbek, Bsharri and Jubayl before leaving at 0340 hours on 23 August over Kafr Killa.
23 August	1215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Beirut, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1835 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1550	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2325 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1920 hours over Rumaysh.
24 August	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1445 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0920	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Jubayl, Shikka and the South before leaving at 1845 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1015	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1510 hours over Rumaysh.
25 August	1355	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1510 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
26 August	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0915 hours over Naqurah.
29 August	0905	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1030 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
30 August	0830	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 0915 hours over Naqurah.
	2150	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2310 hours over Naqurah.
31 August	1350	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1445 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1415	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving on 1 September at 0155 hours over Rumaysh.
	2245	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2330 hours over Rumaysh.

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Letter dated 29 September 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 2244 (2015), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments thereto.

I would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Rafael Darío Ramírez **Carreño**
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant
to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea

16-16249 (E) 101016

Please recycle

Letter dated 19 September 2016 from the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

In accordance with paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 2244 (2015), I have the honour to transmit the requested report on the implementation of paragraphs 23 and 24 of the resolution and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

The humanitarian community working in Somalia wishes to advise that, as with the previous 10 reports, it maintains the definition of "implementing partner" pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), which is as follows:

> "Implementing partner" — a non-governmental organization (NGO) or community-based organization that has undergone due diligence to establish its bona fides by a United Nations agency or another NGO and that reports when requested to the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia on mitigation measures. Implementing partners have the following characteristics:
>
> (a) The organization is part of the consolidated appeals process for Somalia (or the Common Humanitarian Fund) process; and/or
>
> (b) The organization is represented in a cluster's 3W matrix (*Who* does *What* and *Where*).

I remain available should you have any questions about the content of the report or need further clarification on the humanitarian situation in Somalia.

(*Signed*) Kyung-wha **Kang**
Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator

Report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2244 (2015), the resolution succeeding resolutions 1916 (2010), 1972 (2011), 2060 (2012), 2111 (2013) and 2182 (2014), in which the Council established the reporting requirement, and the eleventh submission in total pursuant to those resolutions. The Council, in paragraph 24 of its resolution 2244 (2015), requested the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator to report by 15 October 2016 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and any impediments thereto.

2. The present report covers the period from September 2015 to September 2016. It is focused primarily on the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected people in areas under the control or influence of Al-Shabaab, which was included on the sanctions list pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1844 (2008), by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea on 12 April 2010. As in the previous 10 reports (S/2010/372, S/2010/580, S/2011/125, S/2011/694, S/2012/546, S/2012/856, S/2013/415, S/2014/177, S/2014/655 and S/2015/731), outlined herein are constraints to humanitarian access and the operational implications thereof, as well as mitigation measures put in place to address the politicization, misuse and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance. The report is based on information gathered in consultation with relevant humanitarian organizations active in Somalia and information from the Risk Management Unit in the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator for Somalia.

Humanitarian situation

3. The humanitarian situation in Somalia remains precarious owing to persistent climate variability, armed conflict, clan violence, insecurity, human rights violations, displacement and poor basic services. During the *deyr* rainy season between October and December 2015, flooding affected an estimated 145,200 people. Some 70,000 people were also displaced by floods in Beledweyne, Hiraan region, in May 2016. Humanitarian partners provided life-saving assistance and rehabilitated damaged infrastructure to mitigate the impact of future flooding. Drought conditions since September 2015 exacerbated by the El Niño phenomenon also compounded an already-fragile humanitarian situation, with some 5 million people in total, or 41 per cent of the population, in need of assistance. More than 1.1 million people are unable to meet their basic food needs. Some 300,000 children under 5 years of age are acutely malnourished, including more than 50,000 who are severely malnourished and require urgent treatment. The northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland were hardest hit by the drought. Partners mounted a life-saving response in those regions, but, while the *gu* rains from March to June provided some relief, they were not sufficient to enable a full recovery. In August, the Puntland authorities appealed for humanitarian assistance for more than 1.2 million people affected by drought. Furthermore, the food security situation in parts of the country is expected to deteriorate between October and December

owing to erratic rains and a below-average *gu* harvest, especially in the major cereal-producing regions of Bay and Shabelle Hoose.

4. Acute watery diarrhoea/cholera remained a challenge in 2016. From January to mid-July, more than 13,000 cases, over half of them children under 5 years of age, were reported, an alarming increase when compared with the 5,257 cases reported in 2015 as a whole. With the support of partners, the Ministry of Health finalized the first draft of a five-year preparedness and response plan of action against acute watery diarrhoea/cholera. The outbreak came at a time when critical health services were already at risk of being scaled down for lack of funding. By the first quarter of 2016, at least 10 health facilities had either reduced their services or closed for lack of funding, while those that remained open were struggling to meet health needs. Overall, some 3.2 million people are in need of access to minimum emergency health services.

5. The access challenges, insecurity and funding gaps notwithstanding, partners had reached about 2.5 million people with some form of assistance by December 2015. Premised on the 2016 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan, assistance continued to reach those in need. Between January and June 2016, humanitarian partners reached 490,500 people with food assistance and 142,400 people with activities aimed at building livelihoods. Some 490,000 people were reached with livelihood seasonal inputs, including seeds, tools, fishing equipment, irrigation vouchers and livestock vaccinations. A total of 125,000 children under 5 years of age were treated for acute malnutrition. More than 1.6 million people received basic health services, and in excess of 1 million were provided with temporary or sustainable access to safe water. The protection cluster also reached nearly 123,000 people, while education partners reached 89,000 learners with temporary learning spaces, school supplies and school feeding programmes. More than 81,600 people were assisted with non-food items and transitional shelter.

6. The 2016 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan remained underfunded compared with the persistently high needs. By the end of September, it had received $297 million, or 34 per cent, of the $885 million requested. Another $116 million was provided for the humanitarian response outside the Plan. The Plan is premised on a three-year strategy (2016-2018) that takes into account that drivers of needs in Somalia are largely cyclical and long running and therefore cannot be resolved in a single year. To achieve the vision outlined in the Plan, predictable and timely funding is crucial to enhance preparedness and early response. A call for aid was launched on 31 March by the humanitarian country team, requesting $127 million for drought response in Puntland and Somaliland. With needs increasing as a result of drought, flooding and acute watery diarrhoea/cholera, pooled funds (the Central Emergency Response Fund and the Somalia Humanitarian Fund) have boosted the response. Since January, $29.2 million has been allocated collectively from pooled funds, with an estimated $22.3 million used to ramp up drought response in Puntland and Somaliland, flood response in Beledweyne, Hiraan region, and acute watery diarrhoea/cholera response in the Banaadir, Juba Hoose and Shabelle Hoose regions. Another $7 million is supporting the humanitarian response to internally displaced persons in Baidoa, Bay region, and Kismaayo, Juba Hoose region.

7. In May 2016, the Government of Kenya, driven by what it described as security concerns, announced its intention to expedite the closure of the Dadaab

refugee camp, which mainly hosts Somali refugees. While continuing to advocate that returns and other durable solutions be carried out only on a voluntary basis, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and humanitarian partners have developed an action plan that provides for enhanced return assistance to address the most immediate humanitarian needs of returnees and to catalyse reintegration support through community-based projects in the key areas of return. According to the verification exercise undertaken between July and August 2016, Dadaab is host to about 280,000 refugees, down from over 326,000 in 2015. By August, more than 24,000 Somali refugees had returned to Somalia from the camp since the beginning of the voluntary repatriation in December 2014. Of those, 18,110 had returned since the beginning of 2016 alone, more than triple the number of returns recorded in 2014 and 2015 combined. A total of 10,057 people returned between June and August, pointing to a significant increase in the number of returns. Most of the returnees have settled in the Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Juba Dhexe, Juba Hoose and Shabelle Hoose regions and in the Banaadir region (Mogadishu). About 50,000 refugees have expressed a desire to return to Somalia before the end of 2016. Meanwhile, irregular migration of Somalis crossing the sea to seek opportunities abroad continues, owing to instability and a lack of education and employment opportunities. According to the Federal Government, 200 Somali migrants were among the 500 people who drowned in the Mediterranean Sea in a boat tragedy in April 2016. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, an estimated 32,400 people have arrived in Somalia from Yemen since March 2015, of whom more than 28,000 are Somalis. In addition, more than 1.1 million Somalis remain internally displaced and continue to face a high risk of forced eviction, discrimination, violation of children's rights and gender-based violence. Almost 130,000 internally displaced persons were forcibly evicted in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Boosaaso, Gaalkacyo, Hargeysa and Kismaayo in 2015, while 31,000 have been forcefully evicted since the beginning of 2016.

Security situation

8. The security situation in Somalia remains volatile, affecting civilians and the operating environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Attacks against humanitarian personnel and assets complicate an operational context beset by insecurity and other access challenges. During the first seven months of 2016 alone, more than 90 violent incidents had a direct impact on humanitarian organizations, leading to the death of 7 humanitarian workers, the injury of 8, the arrest of 10, the abduction of 3 and the assault and detention of 5. In 2015, more than 140 incidents had a direct impact on humanitarian organizations and led to the death of 17 humanitarian workers, the injury of 18, the abduction of 11 and the arrest of 38. Humanitarian organizations continue to be affected, both directly and collaterally, mainly by remote violence and attacks in populated areas.

9. At least half of the deaths of humanitarian workers recorded occurred collaterally, when staff were caught in attacks in populated areas. On 25 June, a doctor working for a humanitarian organization was killed along with 14 others in a complex attack against the Naso-Hablod hotel in Mogadishu, while another humanitarian worker was killed along with 13 others in a twin vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack on 26 July in Mogadishu. At least 11 security personnel contracted by the United Nations were also killed, while 12 sustained

injuries. The explosion also damaged United Nations infrastructure. Indirect attacks, including mortar bombs, have also caused damage, mainly to United Nations facilities. In February, June and July, mortar bombs landed in the United Nations compound in Mogadishu, which is the main operations base and holds the accommodation for the United Nations mission and most United Nations humanitarian organizations. In Baidoa, Bay region, a mortar bomb attack on 2 July affected United Nations humanitarian organizations when two projectiles struck the compound, injuring a security guard and damaging an armoured vehicle in addition to the house of a national United Nations staff member.

Humanitarian response, access constraints and operational implications

10. Delivering humanitarian assistance remains extremely difficult in Somalia, especially in areas under the control of Al-Shabaab. International partners continue to deliver aid through local partners, especially in those areas, given that agencies are unable to operate directly. Roadblocks and checkpoints manned by armed actors in southern and central Somalia severely hamper delivery. Non-State armed actors have continued to implement a ban on commercial activities in areas under their control in the Bakool, Bay, Gedo and Hiraan regions, affecting the transfer of humanitarian supplies and basic commercial commodities. Overall, road access is severely constrained in 28 districts in southern and central Somalia and in the contested Buuhoodle district in the north of the country. As in previous years, the three main roads most affected are Mogadishu-Buulobarde-Beledweyne, Mogadishu-Baidoa-Doolow and Mogadishu-Baraawe-Kismaayo. While progress has been made, including the negotiation of access to areas such as Xuddur, Bakool region, humanitarian organizations remain able to have access to Buulobarde (Hiraan region), Diinsoor (Bay region), Garbahaarrey (Gedo region) and Waajid (Bakool region) only by air.

11. As part of efforts to implement road blockades and movement restrictions, non-State armed actors have continued to target trucks carrying supplies. Supplies are often seized, confiscated and/or destroyed, and civilian transporters reportedly punished if apprehended. Methods of punishment vary, but have reportedly gone as far as execution. On 19 June, non-State armed actors set ablaze three trucks carrying supplies near Qurac Joome, Bakool region, two of which had been rented by a humanitarian organization to deliver food. On 26 June, non-State armed actors reportedly killed three civilian men in Ceel Lahelay, Bakool region, allegedly for supplying livestock products to Xuddur. On 19 July, non-State armed actors in Aw Dheegle, Shabelle Hoose region, burned food imported from Turkey on the outskirts of the village. Similar killings of civilian transporters and confiscations of commercial and relief supplies have also been reported in other areas in the Bakool, Bay, Gedo and Hiraan regions, where Al-Shabaab continues to implement its ban on commercial activities. Incidents of looting and destruction of relief items attributed to Al-Shabaab militias were also registered in other areas in southern and central Somalia. In Afmadow, Juba Hoose region, non-State armed actors looted food aid from a warehouse of a humanitarian organization and destroyed office equipment.

12. Road access limitations lead to increased operational and transportation costs for humanitarian agencies delivering life-saving assistance to areas of need. They also increase commercial food prices as traders pass on the high cost of operating in

insecure areas to consumers. For example, non-State armed actors implemented a blockade on Buulobarde, Hiraan region, in March 2014, restricting the freedom of movement of local people and the ability of humanitarian organizations to provide assistance. While Al-Shabaab eased the blockade early in 2016 to allow the movement of commercial supplies from Beledweyne and Mogadishu through Jalalaqsi, commercial transporters are subject to illegal taxes — reportedly $45 for commercial/passenger vehicles and as much as $200 if the vehicle is just beginning services in the area. One-way receipts are issued to enable the vehicle to ply the routes in all areas under Al-Shabaab control in the central region. According to local communities, the retail prices of essential commodities are generally higher in areas controlled by non-State armed actors owing to the increased costs of moving commercial supplies.

13. The proliferation of checkpoints manned by armed actors, including those allied to the Federal Government, continues to restrict road access along major supply routes and the movement of humanitarian and commercial supplies. For example, public transporters temporarily suspended operations along the Mogadishu-Balcad-Jawhar route in February following the emergence of 11 new unauthorized checkpoints manned by armed actors aligned with the State and allied local militias who charge between $5 and $10 at each checkpoint. In addition, according to commercial transporters, each commercial transporter reportedly pays an average total of between $4,000 and $5,000 at the various checkpoints manned by armed State and non-State actors located along the Mogadishu-Baidoa-Dollow route, which remains the worst affected among all access roads. This results in cost increases for consumers.

14. Dialogue between humanitarian partners and national-level and regional-level senior government authorities to remove checkpoints and facilitate the movement of humanitarian supplies and other essential supplies continued in 2016. Assurances that access impediments would be resolved have been obtained from the Interim South-West Administration and Shabelle Dhexe regional authorities and the federal Ministry of the Interior and Federalism. Advocacy to sustainably address the problem has been accorded priority and will continue. Humanitarian organizations have also continued to call upon the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to strengthen the implementation of its mandate to secure key supply routes, including to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, pursuant to paragraph 6 (d) of Security Council resolution 2297 (2016). Lastly, humanitarian organizations have stressed the need for AMISOM to ensure that all troops aligned to it, including the national armed forces and militia groups fighting alongside the national armed forces, fully abide by international humanitarian and human rights law, take all feasible precautions to prevent and in any event minimize civilian harm in relation to their operations and respect the imperative for humanitarian organizations to observe humanitarian principles.

15. Non-State armed actors have also continued to target civilians, impose what they claim is Sharia law and levy heavy taxes on all productive assets, such as farmland, crops, fruit trees and livestock. There are concerns that this increased extortion of money and possessions from local communities could push vulnerable people further into poverty and undermine their livelihoods and resilience. Local

communities living in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab in Beledweyne and Buulobarde, Hiraan region, have expressed concern over alarming increases in illegal taxation and extortion by Al-Shabaab in recent months. Zakat, which had previously been payable only once a year, is now being enforced for various types of livelihood assets multiple times in a year.

16. Furthermore, there have been changes in the implementation of livestock taxation, with civilians now required to make advance payments before taking livestock to market. Al-Shabaab militants reportedly make estimates depending on the type and size of the livestock and charge 2.5 per cent of the estimated market price to be paid before the livestock is sold. Various types of illegal taxation are levied on trucks ferrying livestock to the port of Boosaaso, including $230 at taxation points manned by Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a, $140 at checkpoints manned by the Galmudug security forces and an average of between $50 and $150 at seven static checkpoints manned by the national armed forces and allied militias and freelance clan militias. Similar reports concerning agricultural products from Shabelle Hoose indicate that charges include $3 per hectare and 10 per cent of the value of a sack of sesame. There are allegedly threats that uncultivated farms will be confiscated, while civilians who fail to pay the taxes are reportedly subject to retribution. For example, non-State armed actors detained some 50 elders for reportedly refusing to provide livestock to them as zakat and proceeded to take the livestock by force in Galcad, Galguduud region.

17. Clan militias are also interrupting humanitarian operations. In June, militiamen attacked a team from a humanitarian organization who were conducting an outreach programme in Faafgumare, Hiraan region. In a similar incident in February, militiamen raided the offices of a humanitarian organization in Marka, Shabelle Hoose region. Five national staff of a third party contractor for a humanitarian organization were briefly detained and allegedly assaulted and robbed by militiamen in Afgooye, Juba Hoose region, in February. Furthermore, looting of relief supplies by communities has been reported. In northern Somalia, three incidents have been recorded per month on average over the past seven months. Occasional incidents continue to be recorded in southern and central Somalia. One was reported on 4 February, when armed men broke into a warehouse storing agricultural equipment donated by a humanitarian organization and looted farming tools in Musubiya, Bay region. In Beledweyne, Hiraan region, local young people looted mosquito nets during a distribution exercise; a community member who intervened was shot and injured.

18. Military operations are compounding existing access challenges. The AMISOM and national armed forces troop realignment and reconfiguration exercise, which in some areas entails troop withdrawals, often with minimal or no advance warning, leaves the local population and humanitarian organizations vulnerable, given that Al-Shabaab militias move in and occupy the vacated locations. Suspension, disruption and/or relocation of humanitarian programmes and withdrawal of humanitarian personnel linked to troop withdrawals and subsequent assumption of control of the respective areas by Al-Shabaab were recorded in areas in the Bakool, Gedo, Hiraan, Juba Hoose and Shabelle Hoose regions in 2015, the first quarter of 2016 and June and July 2016. Project relocation often leaves people in the affected locations with no alternative means to meet their needs.

19. Counter-terrorism measures have continued to inhibit humanitarian action, increasing the perceived risk of operating in areas under Al-Shabaab control, which are the areas in which humanitarian needs are believed to be the highest. Some donor Governments have requested the introduction of specific clauses in funding contracts and partnership agreements with humanitarian organizations referring to their national anti-terrorism legislation and/or policies and making it mandatory for direct recipients to carry out detailed background checks on any implementing partner. Such caveats have continued to undermine the ability of humanitarian organizations to address all needs wherever they are.

20. The regulatory environment for humanitarian activities is a key concern. Humanitarian organizations have continued to report significant increases in bureaucratic impediments that surpass the reasonable information and regulatory functions of local authorities, especially in Puntland and southern and central Somalia. On average, humanitarian partners record more than 10 incidents relating to bureaucratic constraints per month, including multiple registration requirements, such as payment of registration fees and arbitrary taxation. To enable aid to be delivered to people in need more efficiently, humanitarian organizations continue to advocate that the authorities expedite a process to put in place fixed enabling regulatory frameworks and revisit taxation requirements for aid agencies.

21. The difficulties notwithstanding, humanitarian partners continue to reach people in need in all 18 regions. International organizations remain dependent on local non-governmental and community-based organizations to deliver assistance in areas to which they have no access. Some progress has been made through local-level negotiations with non-State armed groups in areas such as Xuddur and Tayeeglow, Hiraan region. The United Nations is working closely with partners to strengthen their capacity to deliver life-saving assistance where it is most needed. The humanitarian country team established an access task force in November 2015 to support the humanitarian community to tackle these challenges. Dialogue with national-level and regional-level senior government authorities has been initiated on various issues to facilitate the delivery of assistance.

Risk mitigation measures

22. Humanitarian organizations strengthened efforts to identify and detect factors that could lead to aid diversion, to evaluate the capacity of implementing partners and to track programmes with stronger reporting and auditing tools to verify the delivery of critical, life-saving programmes.

23. The Risk Management Unit provided the United Nations system with risk management advice, risk management training, monitoring services and risk assessments for potential and existing partners. Risk assessments contain tailored recommendations designed to help agencies to address or mitigate identified risks, including fiduciary, fraud, programme, integrity and reputational risks. The Unit continues to support the Office of Internal Oversight Services as required, through its monitoring team and risk analysts. The Unit developed and updated its Contractor Information Management System to enable the sharing of contract and risk-related information between United Nations agencies. The database contains information contributed by the Unit and 14 United Nations agencies on more than 2,500 contractors and suppliers to the United Nations in Somalia. The value of

contracts covered therein exceeds $4.2 billion. Regular updates include the listing of entities subject to Security Council sanctions and periodic updates of the World Bank exclusion list and the International Criminal Police Organization list of wanted persons for Somalia. Individuals and organizations identified in the reports on Somalia by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea are added to the database as and when required.

24. The Somalia risk working group, chaired by the Risk Management Unit, shared information on high-risk partners and collaborated in seeking common approaches to risk management challenges. The Unit also chairs the multiparty risk working group, made up of United Nations agencies, donors and non-governmental organizations.

25. The Risk Management Unit released an online introduction to risk management course in 2015, which was initially made available to all United Nations staff in Somalia and later released to the wider donor, government and non-governmental organization community. The course provides an introduction to risk management processes, based on the ISO 31000 risk management standard, and is aimed at building risk management knowledge and awareness throughout the Somalia aid community. The Unit increased its engagement with several international non-governmental organizations through the provision of advice and feedback on those entities' due diligence processes.

26. The Somalia Humanitarian Fund, managed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, supports a timely and coordinated response providing funds targeted to meet the highest priority needs as identified by partners on the ground. The Fund is governed by global guidelines for country-based pooled funds and includes an accountability framework complete with a set of robust risk management tools. The tools determine partner risk levels by integrating the results of partners' capacity assessments, audit reports and performance and monitoring information. Information from third party contractors and other external sources is also considered. Partner risk levels are used to determine the control mechanisms that are then applied to partner selection, including funding tranches, frequency and type of monitoring and reporting required and maximum budget amounts. Additional compliance measures require all partner audit and reporting requirements to be met before additional funds are approved.

27. More recently, additional guidance to manage cases of possible fraud or misappropriation has been implemented with a view to finding amicable solutions to recover funds and potentially improve partnerships. Nevertheless, challenges remain in seeking justice and recovering funds in more serious cases in which criminal activity has been discovered; efforts are continuing to actively address these issues. With more robust systems implemented since 2012 in the post-famine environment, there has been a significant reduction in the number of cases of possible fraud detected. Of the three cases identified since 2013, one was self-reported by the non-governmental organization, one was identified through monitoring mechanisms and one proved to be the genuine delivery of services in line with the fund agreement.

Impact of paragraphs 23 and 24 of resolution 2244 (2015)

28. Paragraph 23 of resolution 2244 (2015) provides that, until 15 November 2016, the obligations imposed on Member States under paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) are not to apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia. While organizations surveyed during the reporting period did not explicitly comment on the impact of paragraphs 23 and 24 of resolution 2244 (2015) on their ability to implement programmes, the non-renewal of the humanitarian exemption would result in additional obstructions to and delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, especially in areas controlled by non-State armed groups.

Conclusion

29. After more than two decades of turmoil and being seen as a failed State, Somalia continues to be on a positive, albeit delicate, trajectory towards peace and stability. This encouraging trend comes against a background of persistent humanitarian needs, chronic insecurity, human rights violations and inherent vulnerabilities. As a result of progress made on the political front, the Federal Government, with its constituent states, and the international community are now increasingly focused on addressing the underlying causes of vulnerabilities, durable solutions and long-term development priorities. The Somali Compact between the Federal Government and the international community — and now the Somali-led national development plan — provide critical opportunities to end drivers of humanitarian crises. One such example is the solutions initiative for internally displaced persons, which seeks long-term development solutions to protracted displacement and has led to solutions being mainstreamed as a development priority in the forthcoming national development plan.

30. Delivering aid remains extremely difficult in Somalia, but humanitarian organizations continue to strike a balance between respecting security concerns and ensuring effective service delivery in line with the principle of staying, protecting and delivering. Humanitarian partners also continue their work, notwithstanding the significant access and security challenges, and continue to require flexible and timely funding to effectively assist 3.5 million of the estimated 4.7 million Somalis in need of assistance. The delivery of assistance remains costly and unsustainable. The elimination of impediments, including checkpoints, to improved road access is required to enhance people's livelihoods and to enable humanitarian partners to deliver life-saving assistance effectively. Humanitarian organizations continue to advocate that AMISOM strengthen the implementation of its mandate to secure key supply routes, including to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, pursuant to paragraph 6 (d) of Security Council resolution 2297 (2016) and Somalia-specific civil-military guidelines signed by the United Nations and AMISOM in November 2014.

31. In the light of the foregoing, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator invites the Security Council to renew the humanitarian exemption provided in paragraph 23 of resolution 2244 (2015).

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Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 29 September 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the Russian Federation's Supreme Court decision to ban the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 68 (c), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-16961 (E) 041016

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Annex to the letter dated 29 September 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the Russian Federation's Supreme Court decision to ban the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly protests against the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to uphold the decision to label the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People an extremist organization and ban its activities.

A ban of the highest representative executive body of the Crimean Tatar people under the false pretext of "fighting extremism" is an explicit affront by the occupying Russian authorities to the rights and interests of the Crimean Tatars. Under article 280.1 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, on "extremism", the so-called "law enforcement authorities" of Crimea initiated a number of criminal proceedings against the Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis, Akhtem Chiyhoz, and Crimean Tatars Ali Asanov, Mustafa Dehermendzhy, Eskender Cantemir, Eskender Emirvaliev and Arsen Yunusov (the "26th of February" case), as well as the deputy head of the Mejlis, Ilmi Umerov, and other Ukrainian citizens of Crimean Tatar descent.

We consider this cynical decision a manifestation of racial discrimination. This is a step expected of Russia's highest court, totally consistent with the Kremlin's current repressive policies which aim to fight against democracy and freedom and transform the occupied peninsula into a "grey zone" of terror and lawlessness.

During its 2½ years of occupation, the Russian Federation has not only deliberately and systematically violated human rights and restricted freedoms in the Ukrainian Crimea but also completely destroyed the independent mechanisms that guarantee and protect these rights. In particular, this is signified by the deliberate ban of the Mejlis — a government body which has effectively defended the rights of the indigenous people of the peninsula and functioned for decades — and its replacement with the Russian-controlled "Qirim".

We fully recognize that the independent and deliberate civil position of the Mejlis and its consistent support for Ukraine's territorial integrity and its international standing made it the target of the Russian Federation's political persecution. By labelling the Mejlis's work illegal and arbitrarily pursuing activists from this body and the Crimean Tatar people as a whole, the Russian Federation, in fact, operates with Stalinist methods, the culmination of which was the criminal act of the mass deportation and extermination of the Crimean Tatars in 1944.

Ukraine demands that the occupying State immediately reverse this decision, which is null and void in its essence and judicial nature, and completely cease the persecution of the Crimean Tatar community in Crimea.

Ukraine also appeals to its international partners to intensify actions to protect human rights in the occupied Crimea, including to ensure unimpeded access for

international and human rights monitoring organizations and their main conventional and monitoring mechanisms to provide for the continuous monitoring of respect for human rights.

Ukraine believes that the definitive end of the persecution of the Crimean Tatars by the occupying authorities as well as other issues related to the illegal occupation of Crimea can be achieved only through the de-occupation of the territory and restoration of the foundations of international law and order therein and respect for international law and for human rights.

Ukraine will prove in courts the illegitimacy of all of the Russian Federation's actions connected to the temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, including the decision to label the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people an extremist organization and ban its activities.

United Nations A/71/420–S/2016/829

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Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 28 September 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

In accordance with Article 97 of the Charter of the United Nations and the joint letter of the President of the seventieth session of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council dated 15 December 2015 (A/70/623-S/2015/988), I have the honour to transmit a letter from the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria, Boyko Borissov, on the decision of the Government of Bulgaria to nominate Kristalina Georgieva as the sole and unique candidate of Bulgaria for the position of Secretary-General (see annex).

I would like to kindly request your assistance in having the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 121, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Georgi **Panayotov**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-17024 (E) 071016

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Annex to the letter dated 28 September 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

Letter dated 28 September 2016 from the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

In the light of the latest deliberations of the Security Council for the selection of the next Secretary-General, I would like to announce that the Government of Bulgaria has decided to reconsider its nomination for this position.

Therefore, and in accordance with Article 97 of the Charter of the United Nations and in response to the joint letter of the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council dated 15 December 2015 (A/70/623-S/2015/988), I have the honour to inform you of the decision of the Government of Bulgaria to nominate Kristalina Georgieva as its sole and unique candidate for the position of the next Secretary-General.

Bulgaria believes that the selection of a new Secretary-General will be aided by the nomination of Ms. Georgieva as a candidate for the post. This is based on her outstanding personal and professional qualifications. The Government of the Republic of Bulgaria is also mindful of the need to widen the choice of female candidates and to reinforce its region's prospects.

As her biography attests, Ms. Georgieva has demonstrated, in her years in the international arena, a remarkable set of leadership and professional skills. She has been at the heart of complex multilateral negotiations in which her own role has been instrumental in securing ambitious outcomes. She has shown herself to be an effective reformer in the different organizations for which she has worked, earning the support and loyalty of colleagues. Many will no doubt attest to the interest and excitement that her leadership has generated.

Ms. Georgieva has exhibited an informed and substantive grasp of the complex files that she has been tasked with over the years, from environment and climate change to development and humanitarian activities and management and corporate governance. She is known for achieving real progress through her collaborative approach and innovative thinking.

Her experience as the current Vice-President for Budget and Human Resources of the European Commission, in which she is responsible for negotiating and managing the European Union's budget, and her time as Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response make her uniquely qualified to deal with the challenges facing the United Nations.

Finally, Ms. Georgieva also brings a deep understanding of different global perspectives, having lived and worked, in addition to her home city of Sofia, in Brussels, Moscow and Washington, D.C. She has travelled extensively over many years to work towards achieving social and economic objectives with tangible benefits.

Ms. Georgieva's curriculum vitae is attached herewith for reference (see enclosure).

(*Signed*) Boyko **Borissov**

Enclosure

Curriculum vitae

Kristalina Georgieva

Kristalina Georgieva has extensive leadership and managerial experience from decades of policymaking and implementation at the global level, having held an impressive array of top posts in international bodies such as the World Bank and the European Commission.

She has been at the forefront of innovative action on humanitarian aid, poverty reduction, sustainable development, climate change and building resilient societies. An economist by training, she is known for her agile and analytical mind and determined collaborative approach. She has forged a powerful reputation as a modernizer, increasing organizational efficiency, reforming financing and focusing on performance.

Ms. Georgieva is currently the Vice-President for Budget and Human Resources of the European Commission, a post she has held since November 2014. In this role, she is responsible for securing and managing the European Union's €155 billion budget and for strengthening its focus on performance and results. She is credited with more than doubling the funding available to tackle the refugee crisis. Under her leadership, the Commission adopted a series of staff management reforms and has significantly increased the number of women in senior positions.

As Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response at the European Commission from 2009 to 2014, Ms. Georgieva oversaw the delivery of life-saving assistance to more than 500 million women, men and children affected all over the world by conflicts and natural disasters. She has been heavily involved in international efforts to respond to crises in the Sahel, Yemen and the Central African Republic and, through her presence in the field, has worked to draw attention to the plight of those who would otherwise be forgotten. During her mandate she successfully championed prevention and resilience-building, with a lasting policy and operational impact.

In May 2015, the Secretary-General appointed Ms. Georgieva to co-chair a high-level panel on humanitarian financing to look into ways to close the gap between the rising need for humanitarian aid and the resources available. The panel's recommendations have already resulted in important changes for more cost-effective and long-term funding in protracted crises.

Prior to joining the European Commission, Ms. Georgieva was Vice-President and Corporate Secretary at the World Bank from 2008 to 2010. She played a key role in the Bank's governance reforms and accompanying capital increase in the wake of the 2008 international financial crisis. During her 17 years at the Bank, she oversaw the design and implementation of key economic, environmental and social safety net programmes, working in more than 60 countries in Europe, Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific. As Manager and later Director for Environment, she led the phasing-out of leaded gasoline in Central and Eastern Europe, the preparation of the Bank's first environmental strategy and the move of the World Bank Group

towards supporting green growth, carbon neutrality and the development of carbon markets. From 2004 to 2007, she was posted to Moscow as Country Director for the Russian Federation, with responsibility for a $2 billion project portfolio and the introduction of new financial instruments, such as lending without sovereign guarantees and fee-for-service.

Ms. Georgieva was born in 1952 and spent her early professional life as a university professor at the University of National and World Economy in Sofia. She graduated with an MA in Political Economy and Sociology and a PhD in Environmental Policy. She has lectured at numerous universities around the world, including Moscow State University, the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Tsinghua University in China, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, the London School of Economics, the University of the South Pacific in Fiji and the Australian National University. She has more than 100 academic papers and a microeconomics textbook to her name and has completed the Executive Development Programme at Harvard Business School.

Ms. Georgieva is an international member of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development and has served on the boards of the Institute for Sustainable Communities and the University of National and World Economy in Sofia. In 2016, the organization Devex named her as one of the five most influential women in global development.

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Third report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat

I. Introduction

1. In adopting its resolution 2253 (2015), the Security Council expressed its determination to address the threat posed to international peace and security by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh)[1] and associated individuals and groups, as well as emphasizing the importance of cutting off its access to funds and preventing it from planning and facilitating attacks. In paragraph 97 of the resolution, the Council requested me to provide an initial strategic-level report, followed by updates every four months thereafter.

2. The present report was prepared with the input of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2014) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, which supports the work of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as well as in close collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and other relevant United Nations actors and international organizations. In addition to providing an update on the gravity of the threat posed by ISIL and associated groups and entities, I also consider the presence and influence of ISIL outside Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, including in Yemen, East Africa, and South and South-East Asia. In the report, I have adopted a regional focus in highlighting the efforts and progress of Member States of South and South-East Asia to implement counter-terrorism measures in a number of thematic areas, and I consider how Member States are dealing with the issue of foreign terrorist fighters who return to their home States. The use of information and communications technology by ISIL, the issue of conflict-related sexual violence and the range of technical assistance and capacity-building efforts undertaken by the United Nations and its partners are also addressed.

[1] Listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

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II. Overview of current threat

A. ISIL under pressure in conflict zones

3. Since my second report (S/2016/501), ISIL has continued to experience significant military setbacks in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. ISIL affiliates, which had taken on a more prominent role, have also been subjected to sustained attacks in their strongholds in Afghanistan and in Sirte, Libya. This has undermined the group's ability to achieve its key objective of holding territory. One Member State reported that continuing military pressure in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic had forced the group's core leadership to change its command and control structures in those States by transferring decision-making powers downwards and reducing centralized management (see S/2016/629, para. 7).

4. The military setbacks have placed significant pressure on the group's capacity to generate assets, especially income from the sale of oil (see S/2016/501, para. 10). Since the publication of my second report, ISIL has continued to struggle financially, while at the same time attempting to adapt to its new reality. ISIL has intensified its efforts at "taxation"/extortion to compensate for the loss of revenue from oil and, by some estimates, earns as much as $30 million per month from this revenue source, which includes forced "zakat", business "taxes", fees for electricity and water, "rent" for seized real estate, and customs duties and passage fees (see S/2016/629, para. 14). In response to these financial pressures, ISIL has increased the rate and number of its "taxes" and has even been "taxing" the most impoverished civilians, who had previously been excluded (see ibid.).

5. The worsening financial situation has weakened the group's ability to "govern" (see ibid., para. 13). Salary cuts and delays in payment have also led some ISIL fighters to abandon the group.[2] Reports of corruption, including theft of money and gold, within its ranks may be another sign of the group's deteriorating finances (see ibid., para. 15).

6. As ISIL continues to lose territory, its ability to raise funds through "taxation"/extortion will also dwindle. Consequently, it may be forced to rely on more traditional terrorist revenue streams, including criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom[3] and external donations.[4] According to one assessment, ISIL may also become involved in various forms of smuggling, which might be less profitable, but also more difficult to counter through military action.[3]

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[2] Testimony of the Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, Daniel L. Glaser, to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Trade of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 9 June 2016.

[3] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, "The UK's role in the economic war against ISIL", 5 July 2016, paras. 47-48.

[4] Thus far, ISIL has not been dependent on external donations. As ISIL loses territory, not only will it lose the revenue streams associated with its control of territory, but the "burn rate" (indicating how fast it is using up its funds) will also decline (see S/2014/815, para. 79) as costs associated with control of territory decrease. Thus, even if they continue on the same scale, donations may account for a bigger percentage of the group's overall income and play a more significant role in its overall finances.

7. The military offensive of August 2016 aimed at ending the group's control over the Syrian city of Manbij, combined with the continuing military pressure exerted on ISIL in surrounding areas, will place additional pressure on the group, including by limiting its access to international borders outside the immediate conflict zones.

B. Strategic competition and tactical cooperation

8. The threat posed by ISIL continues to be significant and to diversify. Since my second report, Al-Qaida and ISIL and associated entities have continued to compete strategically. Despite the competing visions of "emirate" and "caliphate", and violent clashes concerning resources and territory,[5] however, ISIL operatives have used their personal relationships with individuals from Al-Qaida to support their preparations for major attacks in Europe (in 2015 and 2016) and Kenya (in 2015). Member States also noted that Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIL had provided operational support to each other in Yemen. This demonstrates that personal relationships between individual terrorists can be more important than a shared belief in a radical ideology. Individuals who leave conflict zones to perpetrate attacks in their States of origin or in other conflict zones may be able to count on the support of a number of groups and therefore present an elevated concern.

C. Increasing numbers of returnees

9. The military pressure currently being exerted on ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic has resulted in an increase in the number of foreign terrorist fighter returnees, in particular to Europe and the Maghreb. This poses new challenges to Member States. Foreign terrorist fighters and returnees have adjusted to countermeasures taken by Member States through the use of "broken travel", encryption and the "dark net".

10. Member States have informed the Monitoring Team that the number of foreign terrorist fighters returning to their States of origin or residence and potentially intending to perpetrate attacks, along with the number of individuals being radicalized within those States, present a growing challenge to global security. The relative frequency of arrests of active ISIL cells around the globe since my second report demonstrates this growing risk.

D. Modus operandi of external attacks

11. The increasing number of returnees may signal a weakening of the group's ability to retain fighters and supporters in conflict zones. However, ISIL has responded to military pressure by increasing the number of externally directed and facilitated attacks and by employing deadlier tactics. The modus operandi used by ISIL operatives in conducting multiple, nearly simultaneous attacks, such as in

[5] Mainly in Afghanistan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

Brussels, Istanbul (Turkey) and Paris,[6] poses particular problems in terms of the security response. First, the flow of information into command and control centres can be overwhelming. Member States reported that that was a deliberate tactic aimed at making it more difficult for States to mount coordinated and targeted responses (see S/2016/629, para. 5). The attacks in Paris in November 2015 demonstrated that the terrorists had studied previous active-shooter scenarios and learned lessons about how to maximize confusion and casualties.

12. In addition to the large-scale operations mounted by ISIL overseas, there have been numerous attacks perpetrated by individuals or small cells. In some cases, the individuals have professed allegiance to ISIL in advance. In others, ISIL has claimed the attackers as its "soldiers". These attacks may have been inspired, rather than directed, by ISIL, but their effects are just as significant, both in terms of the impact on public consciousness and the loss of life.

E. Continuing misuse of information and communications technology by terrorists

13. ISIL continues to assert itself in cyberspace. Potential recruits are increasingly instructed by ISIL recruiters to use closed forums and encrypted messaging systems (see S/2016/629, para. 6). This ongoing recruitment activity is helping to build an ever-increasing transnational network of ISIL sympathizers and fighters, thereby obviating the need for physical proximity between leaders and operational figures. Moreover, ISIL continues to be a prolific publisher of online propaganda, the continued military pressure notwithstanding.

14. Communications through the "dark net" or through encrypted messaging also undermine the ability of even the most sophisticated law enforcement agencies to intercept, and act upon, terrorist messages. Consequently, Member States may lose much of their acquired technological advantage over terror groups.

F. Continuing use of conflict-related sexual violence

15. As noted in my second report (S/2016/501, paras. 44-47), ISIL continues to systematically use sexual violence against Yazidi women and girls in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as against other minorities caught up in the conflict. Even though some women have managed to escape their captors, around 3,800 abducted Yazidis were still missing at the time of writing. This is a matter of grave concern. Those who have escaped have described the appalling conditions under which they were bought, sold, traded and abused. Both girls and boys are advertised online and traded for weapons, suicide vests, cars and a range of other commodities. Thus far, no formal mechanisms have been established to secure the release of those held captive by ISIL. Those who have managed to escape have done so with the help of their families and smugglers or by taking advantage of other opportunities. Some have resorted to suicide as their only escape. The children of women who commit suicide, or who attempt to escape, are beaten or killed as punishment.

[6] The ability to carry out such complex attacks was also demonstrated by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) in the multi-stage attacks perpetrated in Gao, Mali, on 31 May 2016.

16. In Libya, groups pledging allegiance to ISIL have, in some cases, subjected forcibly recruited boys to sexual violence (see A/HRC/31/47).

III. Evolving threat posed by ISIL

17. To highlight the threat presented by ISIL to various regions of the globe, in this report I focus on South-East Asia and Yemen and East Africa.

A. Threat to South-East Asia

18. The rise of ISIL and its establishment of a "caliphate" have also reverberated in South-East Asia, inspiring new individuals and re-energizing pre-existing terrorist networks,[7] thereby presenting a resurgent threat to the region. According to one Member State, for the first time since the Afghan conflict, South-East Asian extremists have travelled abroad in a systematic manner to join a global militant movement, thereby developing combat skills and establishing contacts.[8]

19. South-East Asian foreign terrorist fighters are not only inspiring, but also actively directing, attacks in the region. One Member State noted that the grenade attack on the Movida nightclub in Malaysia in June 2016, which injured eight people, had been directed by a Malaysian foreign terrorist fighter in the Syrian Arab Republic. Numerous ISIL-related plots have also been disrupted by authorities in South-East Asia, and hundreds of individuals have been arrested.

20. According to Member States, there has been an uptick in ISIL activity focused on the region in recent months. In June 2016, a group purporting to be an ISIL division in the Philippines released a video on social media depicting Indonesian, Malaysian and Filipino fighters in the Syrian Arab Republic performing executions and urging countrymen who could not travel to the Syrian Arab Republic to join ISIL in the Philippines, carry out attacks at home or send money, thus further aggravating the concern that the southern Philippines could become a hub for fighters from the region (see S/2016/629, para. 51).[9] Also in June, ISIL launched a local-language publication focused on South-East Asia,[10] in a further indication of the region's growing importance to the group's global agenda.

21. The group's focus on South-East Asia is not limited to propaganda. Funds have been channelled to the region from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic,[10] for

[7] Includes former Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092) supporters.

[8] According to a recent regional risk assessment produced under the co-leadership of the financial intelligence units of the Australian Reporting and Analysis Centre and the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre and drawing on information from other regional States, 568 Indonesians are involved in the conflict in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic and 183 are believed to have returned to Indonesia. Eight Malaysian foreign terrorist fighters have been arrested and convicted upon their return to Malaysia. See "Regional risk assessment on terrorism financing 2016: South-East Asia & Australia", August 2016, p. 12.

[9] A number of groups operating in the Philippines, including elements of the Abu Sayyaf Group (QDe.001), have pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. One Member State noted that the Group's capabilities with regard to kidnapping for ransom had grown and become more sophisticated as a result of the ransoms received. See also S/2014/770, para. 50.

[10] Information provided by a Member State.

example for the attack of January 2016 in Jakarta from an ISIL cell based in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic to a network in Indonesia.[11] Funds have also been collected locally to fund operations in the region.[10]

22. The recent attacks in South-East Asia, such as in January 2016 in Jakarta and in June 2016 in Malaysia, have not involved sophisticated tactics and methods.[10] Nonetheless, because the commitment to conduct further attacks is present, the risk remains that battle-hardened returnees from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic[12] or convicted terrorists released from prison who seek to re-engage with terrorist networks[13] will bridge the expertise gap.

B. Threat to Yemen and East Africa

23. In 2014, an ISIL-affiliated group was established in Yemen, with leadership, direction and financing from the ISIL core in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. Member States of the region report that ISIL fighters of various nationalities[14] have also joined ISIL in Yemen. Even though it has intensified its attacks, especially in the Aden area, and has been recruiting in Yemen, ISIL has not yet managed to gain significant local support and is generally rejected by the population.

24. As with attacks by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in the country, ISIL in Yemen targets government buildings and officials. The fierce propaganda competition between Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIL in Yemen notwithstanding, there are no reports of direct clashes between them. Based on reports by Member States, fighters from the two groups appear to be prepared to cooperate at the tactical level.

25. The ISIL leadership has maintained a close interest in Yemen. It is monitoring operations on the ground and gives guidance and direction to its fighters there. In January 2016, an internal leadership struggle within ISIL in Yemen was swiftly addressed by the ISIL core (see S/2016/629, para. 27).

26. Member States have observed the emergence of two ISIL cells in Somalia. The first operates in the Bari mountains of the Puntland region. This group is led by Abdulqader Mu'min, a former Al-Shabaab leader who switched allegiance to ISIL in 2015. The strength of this cell is estimated by Member States at around 300 fighters, who receive financial and logistical support from ISIL in Yemen. One Member State reported that a weapons shipment had been delivered by sea from Yemen early in 2016. Member States reported that ISIL fighters in Somalia were posting photographs of arms smuggled from Yemen on social media. Although ISIL in Yemen is aiding the new ISIL faction in Somalia, the aid is deemed to be

[11] "Regional risk assessment on terrorism financing 2016: South-East Asia & Australia", August 2016, pp. 16 and 33. According to this risk assessment, "while outflows to foreign conflict zones pose a high risk, concern is growing over signs of funding entering the region to support local terrorist actors", p. 4.

[12] See, for example, Thomas Koruth Samuel, *Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: a Selected Case Study of Da'esh in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines* (Kuala Lumpur, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016), p. 105.

[13] Information provided by Member States.

[14] In particular Iraqi, Saudi Arabian, Syrian and Tunisian nationals.

insufficient by Somali ISIL fighters. According to the assessment of several Member States, support is limited because ISIL in Yemen needs to focus its resources on Yemen in order to tackle competition from Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.

27. Member States noted that the second ISIL-aligned group, Jabha East Africa, was operating in southern Somalia in the Raas Kaambooni area. In April 2016, the group announced its allegiance to ISIL, criticizing Al-Shabaab and its links to Al-Qaida and calling upon East Africans to leave Al-Shabaab and to view joining ISIL as an opportunity to wage terrorism more widely. Member States pointed out that the strength of that ISIL-aligned group could not yet be accurately determined.

28. Member States consider that ISIL faces strong resistance in Somalia from Al-Shabaab, which sees ISIL as a new competing faction and has already killed some of its own former members who had defected to ISIL. Member States also noted that around 50 Al-Shabaab defectors had travelled to Yemen in February 2016 and that 17 had joined ISIL in Libya.

IV. Updates on implementation by Member States of the relevant counter-terrorism resolutions

29. The emergence of ISIL and its success in recruiting foreign terrorist fighters have created additional counter-terrorism challenges and increased the urgency of the need to respond to the rapid evolution and escalation of the current terrorist threat through enhanced counter-terrorism measures. The primary responsibility for countering the threat of ISIL lies with Member States. In the present report, I highlight implementation actions taken in South-East Asia, focusing on the issues of returning foreign terrorist fighters and the steps taken by Member States, in particular those of South and South-East Asia, to prosecute, rehabilitate and reintegrate returning nationals.

A. Implementation by Member States of South and South-East Asia

30. Several States of South-East Asia have been the victims of major terrorist attacks. Since the first ISIL-backed[15] suicide bombing took place in Jakarta in January 2016, Indonesia, Malaysia,[16] the Philippines and Singapore[17] have made arrests and thwarted several ISIL-backed terrorism plots.

1. Counter-terrorism strategies and institutional frameworks

31. Four States have introduced and continuously updated national counter-terrorism strategies and have established national counter-terrorism coordinating bodies consisting of all government agencies engaged in countering terrorism with the aim of enhancing inter-agency information exchange and cooperation. They have also

[15] Considered to have been inspired by a South-East Asian ISIL unit in the Syrian Arab Republic.
[16] As at 27 June 2016, 213 terrorist suspects had been arrested in relation to ISIL activities.
[17] On 5 August 2016, six terrorists were arrested for planning to attack Marina Bay in Singapore.

established special counter-terrorism units[18] within the police and the prosecution services. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has introduced several regional instruments to combat terrorism, including the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism of 2007 and the Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter-Terrorism.[19] In July 2016, at the twenty-third meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, held in Vientiane, ministers for foreign affairs reaffirmed the importance of fully implementing those instruments, but further work is needed.

2. Criminal justice and legislation

32. Member States of the region continue to take steps to bring their legislation into line with the requirements set out in resolution 2178 (2014). Two Member States have responded swiftly to the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon by introducing comprehensive counter-terrorism legislation. Two States have introduced special and administrative measures. One State introduced two new counter-terrorism laws in 2015 and amended its existing laws to prevent terrorist incidents. One State has amended its code of criminal procedure to extend detention periods during criminal investigations from seven days to six months for terrorism cases, with a possible extension of more than six months. Three States have indicated that they may cancel foreign terrorist fighters' travel documents to prevent their travel, and one State has introduced a legal provision to revoke the citizenship of such fighters. These measures raise human rights issues that should be carefully considered. Other States have not yet taken the steps necessary to implement resolution 2178 (2014), including measures to criminalize foreign terrorist fighter travel, the financing of foreign terrorist fighters, including their travel, receiving terrorist training, the recruitment of members to terrorist groups, preparatory acts and incitement to commit terrorist acts.

3. International cooperation

33. Because terrorist networks and foreign terrorist fighter travel transcend borders, Member States of different regions increasingly rely on international cooperation with States beyond their traditional bilateral cooperation networks. However, the assessments of the Counter-Terrorism Committee show that there are numerous challenges associated with effective international cooperation in stemming the foreign terrorist fighter flow.

34. In South-East Asia, there is no institutional or operational mechanism in place to conduct joint investigations. Terrorism investigations are conducted by individual States and investigative cooperation is rendered on an ad hoc basis only.

35. South-East Asian States adopted the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty among Like-minded ASEAN Countries in 2004, and the secretariat[20] of the Treaty has established useful tools on its website. However, neither the Treaty nor the website

[18] Indonesia recently created a task force to counter foreign terrorist fighters, in addition to an anti-terror unit and a counter-terrorist financing task force.

[19] The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate helped to develop the Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter-Terrorism.

[20] The secretariat sits with the Malaysian Attorney-General's Chamber.

has been fully utilized[21] by ASEAN member States. There is no regional agreement on extradition.

4. Countering the financing of ISIL and foreign terrorist fighters

36. Although many Member States continue to face challenges in effectively implementing the requirements set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions on preventing and countering terrorist financing, there has also been progress in implementation. For example, the Indonesian financial intelligence unit will establish a national training centre for ASEAN States in Bogor in October 2016 to train, among others, officials of financial intelligence units, central banks and bodies involved in efforts to combat money-laundering and counter the financing of terrorism. Academic institutions, businesses, the media and communities will also be involved in the development of educational tools.

37. States members of the Financial Action Task Force and similar regional bodies are engaged in a review of the risks presented by ISIL and its affiliates with regard to terrorism financing. The top six high-risk States in terms of money-laundering and terrorism financing in South-East Asia and the Pacific regions are Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Two of the most-affected South-East Asian Member States (Malaysia and Singapore) have robust regimes in place to combat money-laundering and counter the financing of terrorism. Another State (Indonesia) had been subject to the monitoring process of the Financial Action Task Force as a result of strategic deficiencies, but made significant progress and was removed from the process in June 2015. In April 2016, the Philippines revoked its banking secrecy law to enhance its regime to combat money-laundering and counter the financing of terrorism.

38. One of the primary challenges for South-East Asian Member States is stemming the raising of funds for ISIL and other terrorist organizations. The most frequently used method to raise terrorist funds in South-East Asia is self-funding by legitimate sources. This presents a significant challenge for law enforcement. There have also been reports of fundraising through the abuse of non-profit organizations and crowdfunding. The physical transfer of cash is considered to be the most frequently used method. Although there is a legitimate concern about the use of new payment methods such as prepaid cards and e-money, terrorist financing through the regular banking system is still expected to rise significantly.

5. Law enforcement and border control

39. The design and implementation of comprehensive border-management strategies continue to be challenging for many Member States, especially in a context of porous borders. States have recognized, however, that putting in place effective border controls remains an essential aspect of countering terrorism and stemming the foreign terrorist fighter flow.

40. No South-East Asian State currently imposes transit visas, and ASEAN allows free movement of people without a visa within the region. Many Member States of this region are transit and destination States for ISIL fighters, however. All South-

[21] There is a strong need for technical assistance to enhance the processing of requests for mutual legal assistance.

East Asian States are increasingly aware of the need to enhance their border management and international cooperation to effectively stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. In November 2015, one State created a new border security agency to strengthen the control of people and goods. Only one State[22] has established immigration officers at border control points with direct access to the databases of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Only two States use advance passenger information[23] to screen for potential terrorist movements at border points. No State has a passenger name record system in place.[24]

41. The issue of forged and falsified travel documents is also a major problem. ASEAN is currently working to promote a digital identity initiative aimed at creating a unique traveller card for all citizens of its member States. Four States have introduced a national electronic identification mechanism with biometrics. States of the region have exchanged specimens of valid passports and trained immigration officers to detect forged travel documents.

6. Countering recruitment and preventing and countering violent extremism

42. States of South-East Asia are paying increased attention to the development of comprehensive approaches to countering and preventing recruitment and violent extremism, including by establishing partnerships with non-governmental actors. States have been strengthening community resilience against radicalization by mobilizing, empowering and networking with religious leaders, community leaders, teachers, young people, children, women, non-profit organizations and private entities in their efforts to counter violent extremism.

43. States continue to express concern at the abuse of the Internet and social media by ISIL and affiliates seeking to recruit new members and to incite the commission of terrorist acts. Governments are endeavouring to strengthen their monitoring and regulatory capacity. For example, Malaysia has launched a regional digital counter-messaging communication centre, which will be fully operational by the end of 2016, and Indonesia is establishing a national cyber agency. The ASEAN Association of Heads of Police and Japan have developed a shared database of websites relating to terrorism, which provides for the translation into English of terrorist propaganda in local languages to facilitate the sharing and analysis of information.

44. Governments and private communications services providers have been collaborating closely in developing counter-narratives and reducing the accessibility of certain content. Companies such as Facebook and Google have been providing platforms and training for young people, content creators and bloggers, in partnership with local government and civil society experts, on creating positive counter-narratives in Indonesia and Malaysia. A number of States have introduced and implemented laws and regulations aimed at detecting and preventing the use of information and communications technology for terrorist purposes and using e-evidence to bring terrorists to justice.

[22] Singapore ranks third in the world in terms of screening against the INTERPOL database of stolen and lost travel documents.

[23] The International Civil Aviation Organization will make advance passenger information mandatory for all its member States in November 2016. Singapore plans to introduce advance passenger information by 2019.

[24] Indonesia will introduce advance passenger information soon.

B. Prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters

45. Since my second report, a growing number of Member States have addressed the potential threat posed by returnees through a broad range of criminal justice, administrative and rehabilitation and reintegration measures, as called for in resolution 2178 (2014). Given the serious threat that terrorism presents to national security and public safety, strong criminal justice measures are widely seen as the most appropriate response. However, the evolving terrorist threat and the risks posed by the increasing number of returning foreign terrorist fighters and deportees have, in many States, inspired the development of a more flexible approach to providing rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.

46. Several States report that a high proportion of their nationals returning from foreign terrorist fighter destinations have either not met the threshold for prosecution or that prosecutions can be brought only for relatively minor offences. States continue to face numerous challenges in their efforts to generate and convert intelligence into admissible evidence against suspected returning fighters. It also remains challenging for Member States to determine the most appropriate and proportionate responses to specific categories of travellers, including minors, dependent family members, persons with mental disabilities and other potentially vulnerable individuals, providers of medical services and other humanitarian needs and disillusioned returnees, or defectors, who have committed less serious offences.

47. Member States have strengthened their efforts to take a more preventive approach to terrorism, including by charging individuals with inchoate and preparatory offence in the early stages before any serious crime or travel has taken place. In such cases, individuals are likely to face only brief prison sentences, if any at all. Many States have also found that a number of individuals charged with terrorism-related crimes, including returning foreign terrorist fighters, have continued to incite, recruit, finance and even plot or prepare terrorist attacks, either during or after their incarceration. In the absence of effective prison-based rehabilitation and aftercare programmes, imprisonment can even exacerbate the risks presented by some inmates. A flexible, case-by-case approach to prosecuting returnees, which provides for the possibility of applying criminal measures, administrative measures and/or reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, can bring numerous benefits, including by enabling intervention before any serious criminal conduct occurs; a response to cases that do not meet the threshold for prosecution; a risk-based and proportionate response to individuals who have committed less serious crimes; a reduction in prison-based recruitment; and a more long-term response for individuals released from prison.

48. The overall progress made by Member States in developing and implementing rehabilitation and reintegration strategies as part of a more comprehensive approach to cases relating to terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters remains more limited in some of the most-affected regions (often in the same States in which criminal justice systems are overwhelmed and lack the capacity to investigate and prosecute complex cases effectively). Given that developing and implementing alternative measures for terrorism-related cases presents new challenges for most Member States, several Member States also require more time and experience to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of their approaches.

1. South Asia

49. Six Member States of South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) have developed and implemented rehabilitation and reintegration strategies as part of their approach to countering terrorism and/or in an effort to build peace, secure the transition from armed conflict or consolidate peace. Most rehabilitation and reintegration programmes in South Asia are aimed at addressing threats posed by domestic terrorist organizations and other non-State armed actors. Those programmes could also strengthen societies' resilience to the increasing efforts of ISIL to radicalize and recruit in States of the region and could be adapted to address the risks posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters. The programmes developed and implemented in the region are noteworthy for the variety of ways in which they have used economic measures, including assistance with housing, education and employment, to assist former terrorists and ex-combatants to reintegrate into society. In some States of the region, such assistance has been provided in the form of grants to ex-combatants' families and communities in order to ensure their support for the rehabilitation and reintegration process. The efforts made by States of the region to engage with individuals' families and communities in the reintegration process are also noteworthy and are likely to have played a role in reducing repeat offending.

50. Persistent and widespread violence and insecurity in some States of the region continue to present obstacles to efforts by States to expand their rehabilitation and reintegration programmes to the most-affected areas. Given the challenges faced by the criminal justice sector, there is also a risk that such programmes will be implemented in the absence of appropriate mechanisms to ensure oversight and review by a judicial or other competent independent authority throughout the programmes' duration. This also presents the risk that offenders will lack appropriate channels through which to challenge their detention or lodge complaints about their treatment. Some detention practices, including in cases involving minors, and poor prison conditions in some States of the region raise significant human rights concerns.

2. South-East Asia

51. South-East Asia has been managing terrorist prisoners and radicalized returnees or deportees since the 1950s. All most-affected States of the region have developed rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for terrorist prisoners. Counter-terrorism-related prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies have been implemented in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. Thailand is currently developing its own approach, together with other States and organizations, including the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Some States have been able to rely on existing experience and expertise gained in using rehabilitation and reintegration programmes initially developed and implemented in response to the threats posed by localized terrorist organizations and non-State armed groups. Those programmes have been adapted in response to current threats, including that posed by ISIL and foreign terrorist fighters.

52. I should like to highlight some examples in this regard. In Indonesia,[25] all deradicalization and rehabilitation programmes for terrorist prisoners are implemented jointly by local governments and the national counter-terrorism coordinating agency at 71 correctional facilities in 23 provinces.[26] In 2015, the Government built a deradicalization centre[27] and is preparing to optimize and centralize the interpretation of deradicalization programmes. Singapore established a religious rehabilitation group in 2003 to counsel detainees alleged to hold extremist beliefs and to challenge inaccurate or unfounded understandings concerning religious doctrine. Malaysia has developed and published an integrated rehabilitation module for detainees to share its experiences.

53. Approaches to rehabilitation and reintegration have included prison-based programmes to prepare individuals to reintegrate into society following their release, in addition to aftercare, welfare and rehabilitation services to reintegrate former offenders. Rehabilitation and reintegration programmes are noteworthy for the way in which they draw upon the support of religious and social counsellors, together with community leaders and family members, in their implementation. States of the region have made a concerted effort to share their research and experiences with one another, as well as with States of other regions, systematically evaluate and assess their own approaches and work with relevant organizations to further strengthen those approaches. In some States, a lack of resources has undermined the implementation of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. Repeat offending cannot be completely avoided,[28] but three States have achieved success in this area, reportedly by convincing particular detainees to renounce violence and obtaining their cooperation in counselling other terrorists and extremists in order to redirect them to non-violent beliefs. Empowering former terrorist inmates and victims is one of the most effective ways to counter radicalization.

V. Range of United Nations efforts in supporting the efforts of Member States to counter the threat of ISIL

54. Since my initial report, United Nations entities have taken a number of steps, in accordance with their individual mandates and in partnership with relevant international and regional organizations, to support the efforts of Member States to counter the threat of ISIL.

A. Foreign terrorist fighters

55. As noted by the Security Council in its presidential statement of 29 May 2015 (S/PRST/2015/11), the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Office has developed a capacity-building implementation plan to stem the flow of foreign

[25] Indonesia co-chairs the Global Counterterrorism Forum Working Group on Detention and Reintegration.

[26] There were 238 terrorist prisoners as at August 2016.

[27] It has a capacity of 150 persons and a library.

[28] For example, Bahrun Naim was a detainee in Indonesia and was released in 2014.

terrorist fighters, acting in close collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Monitoring Team. The plan includes 37 project proposals, submitted by 12 entities, which address the full "life cycle" of the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, including radicalization, travel and financing, as well as eventual investigation and prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration in the case of returnees.

56. On 13 July 2016, representatives of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Office, the Counter-Terrorism Centre, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and INTERPOL met Member States to provide an update on the funding situation of the capacity-building implementation plan and emphasized the urgent need to ensure project implementation. It was also noted that the Centre's project to enhance the understanding of the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon had been affected by the limited access granted by only a few Member States to returnees.

57. Since my second report, UNODC has continued to implement its global initiative on criminal justice responses to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, which is aimed at strengthening national legal and operational frameworks and the capacity of criminal justice and law enforcement officials to respond effectively to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters in compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2253 (2015). The initiative is also aimed at facilitating judicial cooperation, including the sharing of good practices and information among the judiciary and law enforcement at the national, subregional and regional levels. Assistance has been provided to the States of the Middle East and North Africa, the Sahel, Central Asia and the western Balkans.

B. Criminal justice and legislation

58. UNODC has also developed, and is currently seeking financial support for, a programme for South and South-East Asian States on strengthening legal and institutional frameworks for the effective implementation and enforcement of measures targeting the financial flows and economic resources of ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertaking and entities designated in resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015).

59. During the reporting period, UNODC provided assistance on the prevention and criminalization of certain offences regarding foreign terrorist fighters to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan through two workshops, held in Astana on 12 and 13 May 2016 and in Bishkek on 9 and 10 August 2016. UNODC has also been working with the national criminal justice institutions of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as Kosovo,[29] to develop a set of specialized training materials on the prosecution of foreign terrorist fighters for criminal justice practitioners. An expert group to discuss a module for judicial training met in Vienna on 6 and 7 September 2016.

[29] References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

60. In May 2016, UNODC held two moot courts for criminal justice officers from Yemen on the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of terrorism cases, especially cases relating to terrorism financing and the incitement and glorification of terrorism. From 9 to 11 May, UNODC conducted a workshop in which the Jordanian judicial and law enforcement authorities discussed gaps and challenges faced in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases.

C. Countering the financing of terrorism

61. The Counter-Terrorism Centre capacity-building project on terrorist designations and asset-freezing is aimed at helping national regulatory agencies, central bank officials and private sector entities to identify, assess and take action against evolving fundraising and funds-transfer typologies used by ISIL. The capacity-building project includes training relating to the strategic use of sanctions, effective implementation methods, due process guarantees, recommended investigatory and prosecutorial practices and compliance techniques. In response to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015), the project has been expanded to include procedures relating to the designation of ISIL affiliates and the freezing of their assets in a manner compatible with international standards, including human rights standards.

62. The overall objective of the Counter-Terrorism Centre project on kidnapping for ransom is to build the capacity of States and non-governmental organizations in East, West and North Africa to achieve the safe return of hostages, while simultaneously denying terrorist groups such as ISIL the benefits of ransom payments or political concessions. Following two capacity-gap mapping events on responses to kidnapping for ransom, the Centre delivered a first capacity-building workshop on international best practices on addressing kidnapping for ransom, held in Addis Ababa on 28 and 29 June 2016, for government experts from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. The workshop was focused on practical issues such as terrorist trends and case studies with regard to kidnapping for ransom; principles of hostage incident management; inter-agency cooperation; best practices in family liaison; the role of the media; principles of effective communication with kidnappers; legal aspects; managing the involvement of third parties such as interpreters and intermediaries; non-governmental organization perspectives; and post-release assistance. Six additional workshops are planned under this project.

63. Over recent months, UNODC capacity-building activities for States in the Middle East and North Africa have been focused mainly on strengthening judicial and law enforcement capacity to cut off the revenues and economic resources of terrorist groups, including ISIL. From 19 to 21 May, UNODC organized an advanced training workshop for Yemen, at which emerging terrorism-financing risks were addressed.

64. From 15 to 19 May, the UNODC Global Programme against Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism delivered a four-day course on countering the financing of terrorism ("financial disruption") to 20 representatives of agencies from Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, including prosecution, law enforcement, security, finance and commerce officials. From 23 to 27 May, the Global Programme also provided briefings to more than 500 representatives of

special operations forces from 85 States on the role of threat finance and financial disruptions in countering transnational organized crime, terrorist financing, including ISIL, and corruption. In addition, it delivered a four-day financial analysis course on countering the financing of terrorism to financial intelligence investigators from a State member of the Gulf Cooperation Council from 8 to 11 August. The exercises and scenarios were focused on ISIL-related threats, including foreign fighter facilitation, improvised explosive device construction and domestic attack planning, drawing upon current cases from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic.

D. Law enforcement and border control

65. Since 2015, UNODC, acting in cooperation with the World Customs Organization, has been assisting Iraq to prevent terrorist groups, including ISIL, from obtaining, handling and using dual-use chemical materials through the provision of specialized training and the development of national strategies. It is currently considering the procurement of the relevant equipment, subject to funding availability.

66. To assist Member States to comply with their obligation pursuant to resolution 2178 (2014) to stem the cross-border flow of foreign terrorist fighters, the Counter-Terrorism Centre, in close cooperation with its project partners, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the International Air Transport Association, the International Civil Aviation Organization, INTERPOL, the International Organization for Migration and the Monitoring Team, convened the third of five regional workshops on raising awareness and building capacity with regard to advance passenger information. Aimed at European States, the workshop was held in Vienna in July 2016 in conjunction with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In examining the critical role played by advance passenger information and the transfer of passenger data in stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, States also discussed the need to take privacy and data-protection considerations into account. The Centre has also initiated the planning of the fourth workshop, for States of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

67. The Counter-Terrorism Centre continues its close cooperation with the Global Counterterrorism Forum and United Nations entities, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Monitoring Team, the International Organization for Migration, UNODC and the United Nations Development Programme, on a joint border security initiative, initially focused on the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. The Centre finalized the development of a document on good practices, based on lessons learned, including at the regional workshops mentioned in my second report. The document is intended to strengthen the border security and management capacities of Member States to counter terrorist and organized crime groups and stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. The Centre is developing future programming to build the capacities of Member States, at their request, to stem the flow.

68. With the aim of enhancing regional investigative cooperation, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate has been assisting the ASEAN Association of Heads of Police to establish a regional joint operations centre in Kuala Lumpur, where all ASEAN police officers would work together on a daily basis. ASEAN

member States would benefit not only from joint investigations, but also from daily information exchange and regional analysis on specific criminal trends.

E. Countering recruitment and preventing/countering violent extremism

69. Following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 70/291 pertaining to the fifth review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy on the occasion of its tenth anniversary, and at my request, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force has established an inter-agency working group on preventing violent extremism to develop a coherent "All-of-United Nations" approach in supporting the efforts of Member States to prevent violent extremism, in particular through the development of national and regional plans of action to prevent violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism. ASEAN and the United Nations plan to organize a workshop early in November 2016 on the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.

70. Since the adoption of resolution 2178 (2014), several United Nations entities, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, UNODC, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, have worked closely with international and regional organizations and civil society organizations, including the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the European Union Radicalisation Awareness Network, the Global Center on Cooperative Security, the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism and, more recently, the "Prevention Project — Organizing against Violent Extremism", to provide further guidance and assistance to Member States. Useful guidance in this area includes the following: the guiding principles on foreign terrorist fighters, prepared by the Counter-Terrorism Committee and published by the Security Council (see S/2015/939, annex II), including in particular guiding principles 30-32; the Global Counterterrorism Forum Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Phenomenon; the Global Counterterrorism Forum Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders; and the Radicalisation Awareness Network Declaration of Good Practices for Engagement with Foreign Fighters.[30] In July 2016, OHCHR submitted a report on best practices and lessons learned on how protecting and promoting human rights help to prevent and counter violent extremism (A/HRC/33/29). Furthermore, the Human Rights Council convened a panel to discuss the human rights dimensions of preventing and countering violent extremism (see A/HRC/33/28).

[30] The Declaration is available at www.icct.nl/download/file/RAN-Declaration-Good-Practices-for-Engagement-with-Foreign-Fighters.pdf.

F. Protecting human rights while countering terrorism

71. OHCHR has highlighted the importance of ensuring that States integrate compliance with their obligations under international human rights law into their efforts to stem the flow of foreign fighters by strengthening initiatives to address the conditions conducive to terrorism; take measures to counter violent extremism, combat impunity and ensure accountability for any gross violation of international human rights law and serious violation of international humanitarian law; and ensure that any measures that they adopt in their efforts to stem the flow of foreign fighters and prevent the commission of criminal acts comply with their obligations under international human rights law (see A/HRC/28/28). The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has examined the human rights challenges posed by efforts to combat ISIL and expressed concern regarding the broad nature of some of the clauses contained in resolution 2178 (2014) and the possibility that the standard adopted for enforcement action could result in arbitrary enforcement action (see A/HRC/29/51). The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic has continued its critically important work in investigating alleged violations of international human rights law, with a focus on crimes committed by ISIL (see, most recently, A/HRC/33/55 and A/HRC/32/CRP.2). The Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination is engaged in an ongoing study of foreign fighters, including through country visits, panels of public experts and reports to the General Assembly and Human Rights Council (see A/71/318).

72. The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Working Group on Protecting and Promoting Human Rights and the Rule of Law while Countering Terrorism continues to guide the provision, by the Task Force Office and OHCHR, of human rights capacity-building training for law enforcement officials on human rights laws and standards in fair trials, pretrial detention, interview practices, special investigative techniques and the use of force in the context of preventing and countering acts of terrorism. Modules are drafted in response to the specific human rights needs identified by the Working Group in each context. In 2016, the project was implemented in Iraq, Nigeria and Tunisia. It awaits confirmation from Cameroon, Jordan and Mali for implementation in the fourth quarter of 2016. Under the auspices of the Working Group, five basic human rights reference guides have been published in English, French and Arabic on the following subjects: conformity of national counter-terrorism legislation with international human rights law, security infrastructure, the stopping and searching of persons in the context of countering terrorism, detention in the context of countering terrorism, and the right to a fair trial and due process in the context of countering terrorism. The two last-mentioned guides are distributed to participants during training. The Working Group also provides guidance on two continuing research projects with the aim of providing specific guidance to United Nations entities and Member States on human rights-compliant ways to curb the flow of foreign terrorist fighters and consider gender aspects and the protection of women's rights while countering and preventing terrorism.

73. In the context of promoting and protecting human rights, including children's rights, while countering terrorism, UNODC has helped States to strengthen their legal, policy and operational frameworks relating to children associated with violent extremist groups, including terrorist groups, through two subregional workshops (for Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon from 19 to 21 July 2016 and for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger and Senegal from 1 to 3 June 2016). In September, UNODC organized specialized training for Iraqi officers on preventing the forced recruitment of women by terrorist organizations, including ISIL.

G. Rehabilitation and reintegration strategies and mechanisms

74. The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute has enhanced its cooperation with Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, the Philippines and Thailand in the design and implementation of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for violent extremist offenders and foreign terrorist fighters. It deploys tailored capacity-building activities and strategy support on the ground, focusing on the rehabilitation, reintegration and disengagement of foreign terrorist fighters in the detention context, inside and outside prison settings (e.g., a technical workshop held in Thailand from 12 to 14 September 2016 on the creation of programmes for the management of security detainees). Other capacity-building activities will be implemented by the end of 2016. These activities will help Member States to meet their obligations under resolution 2178 (2014).

H. United Nations bodies and field missions

75. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has prepared assessment reports on ISIL, which it shares with Member States to support their efforts to counter the threat posed by the group. It also facilitates regular information-sharing on battlefield-related assistance delivered by individual Member States in efforts to combat ISIL. UNSMIL continues to support the efforts of the Presidency Council in leading the Libyan transition and the establishment of the Government of National Accord to curtail any further expansion of ISIL.

76. The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict continues to engage with the Iraqi authorities to address some of the pressing challenges faced by Iraq with regard to, among other things, the protection of mass graves, the documentation and collection of evidence on sexual violence crimes committed by ISIL and the overall issue of accountability and justice for those crimes. Early in 2017, the Office, acting in collaboration with the League of Arab States, Al-Azhar University and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women regional office, will hold a workshop with Muslim leaders and scholars aimed at sending a clear message dissociating Islam from the use of sexual violence by violent extremist groups such as ISIL and calling for care and support for survivors of sexual violence, their families and communities.

United Nations S/2016/831

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 September 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 13 September 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), established by Security Council resolution 2245 (2015), of 9 November 2015.

Following the usual consultations, I would like to inform you of my intention to appoint Hubert Hudson Price II (United States of America) as the Head of UNSOS. Mr. Price will be the first person to serve in this capacity.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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United Nations S/2016/832

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 September 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 30 September 2016 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 13 September 2016 (S/2016/831) concerning your intention to appoint Hubert Hudson Price II (United States of America) as the Head of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council[1]. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Gerard **van Bohemen**
President of the Security Council

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